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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the liquidity in the Norwegian secondary covered bond market, in 
comparison to other Scandinavian covered and government bond markets. We have gathered 
data on trades and bonds in the markets from market participants and Financial Supervisory 
Authorities in the relevant countries, a process that can be characterized as challenging and 
time consuming. We discuss how new regulations, the reversal of the Government Swap 
Agreement and the introduction of the Norwegian Covered Bonds Benchmark has affected 
liquidity. Further, we investigate any differences in liquidity within the Norwegian covered 
bond market. The research is conducted by implementing different liquidity measures that 
together allow for thorough research of liquidity in the markets we focus on.  
Overall, we find that the liquidity in the Norwegian secondary covered bond market is neither 
higher nor lower than the liquidity in the comparable markets, even if there are important 
differences between some markets. Looking at different groups of bonds in the Norwegian 
covered bond market, we conclude that the larger bonds included in the Covered Bond 
Benchmark have the highest liquidity. Over the last years, the liquidity in the Norwegian 
covered bond market has improved considerably along with the growth of the market. From 
an unstable period with few bonds in the market in 2007 and 2008, all measures point at 
higher liquidity from 2010/2011 in more stable market conditions. We have not been able to 
prove what part new regulations and the reversal of the swap agreement have played in the 
development, but we have some evidence for higher liquidity due to the implementation of 
the Covered Bond Benchmark. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Topic 
The topic of our paper is liquidity in the secondary covered and government bond markets in 
the three Scandinavian countries, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Covered bonds are bonds 
backed by a pool of mortgages, issued by licensed credit institutions. Bond holders own a 
claim to a cover pool, and issuers need to ensure that the value of this pool exceed certain 
predetermined limits. In order to be characterized as covered bonds, and to ensure uniformity, 
a number of requirements must be fulfilled. We want to analyze the change in liquidity in the 
markets from 2007 to 2014, where our primary focus is the Norwegian covered bond market. 
We compare and contrast both the structure and the liquidity development of the markets. 
The Norwegian covered bond market has experienced a considerable growth since the 
introduction in 2007, and has become a very important funding source for banks. In addition 
to this growth, the reversal of the Government Swap Agreement, new regulations and the 
introduction of the Covered Bonds Benchmark make this a very interesting topic. The cost 
banks face when issuing bonds is currently very low, and yields in the secondary market have 
decreased considerably over the last years. Liquidity plays an important role in the maturation 
of this market and increases efficiency. A high level of liquidity lowers the funding cost for 
issuers in that it reduces the interest rate demanded by investors. Considering the current size 
of Scandinavian covered bond markets, this is crucial for issuers. Further, the ongoing 
implementation of the new financial regulatory framework based on Basel III increases the 
importance of liquidity for financial institutions, which enhances the position of covered 
bonds. 
We contribute to the understanding and insight into covered bonds by taking a new approach 
focusing on liquidity. By analyzing data from 2007 until October 2014, we present an 
overview of the liquidity across countries at periods characterized by different market 
conditions and regulatory requirements. Since the Norwegian covered bond market is 
relatively young, we are able to present new and important data on liquidity in the market. 
We present the first effects of the reversal of the Government Swap Agreement and the 
introduction of Covered Bond Benchmark, measures that are likely to increase the market 
liquidity. We have defined the following research topic: 
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How liquid is the Norwegian secondary covered bond market, and how has the liquidity level 
changed from 2007 until 2014? In addition, how does the market compare to the government 
bond market in Norway and the covered and government bond markets in the other 
Scandinavian countries? 
1.2 How the research is conducted 
We base our research on gathered data from Scandinavian marketplaces on trades and issues 
of bonds. In order to focus on the three domestic markets, we only include bonds listed on 
domestic marketplaces in the domestic currency. Most covered and government bonds in the 
different Scandinavian countries are listed on various exchanges. We have excluded bonds 
not listed in order to better compare the markets, and due to difficulties in gathering data on 
unlisted bonds. The collected data is used to assess the liquidity by employing several 
liquidity measures for all markets. The different measures are complementary, which we 
hope will provide a comprehensive overview of the level of liquidity. We then look further 
into the Norwegian covered bond market by comparing bonds and issuers with various 
characteristics, in order to investigate differences within this market. As an example, we 
examine the liquidity in bonds included in the Covered Bond Benchmark, to see if the 
introduction of the benchmark has improved the liquidity in these bonds.  
We evaluate the different markets’ liquidity over time, as well as across markets. Our 
research into the Norwegian covered bond market is the most comprehensive, since it has the 
shortest history and is the market where we expect to see the largest change in the relevant 
period. In order to put the liquidity in this market into context, we compare it to the liquidity 
in the government bond market in Norway and with both government bond and covered bond 
markets in Sweden and Denmark. The Danish market for covered bonds is very large, has a 
long history and is considered to be very mature. This likely results in high liquidity, and 
serves as an interesting benchmark for the Norwegian covered bond market.  
1.3 Summary of results 
The results for all liquidity measures confirm that the liquidity of the Norwegian covered 
bond market has increased from 2007 until 2014. When further comparing the market to the 
other Scandinavian markets our main results is that the liquidity in Norwegian covered bonds 
is neither higher nor lower. There are however important differences between some markets. 
The turnover rate in the Norwegian covered bond market is in general lower than in all the 
comparable markets. The large and highly developed Danish covered bond market and the 
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Swedish government bond market stand out with significantly higher turnover rates. The 
measures we have employed give us contradictory results at times, but in total, we conclude 
that the liquidity level in the Norwegian covered bond market is average compared to the 
other markets. 
Looking at different groups of bonds in the Norwegian covered bond market, we conclude 
that the bonds included in the Covered Bond Benchmark have the highest liquidity. The 
results were unambiguous for all measures except Roll’s bid-ask measure. We also study the 
change in liquidity for the bonds included in this benchmark, to consider the possible effect 
of the introduction of this in June 2014. Also here we found evidence for improved liquidity 
on all measures except Roll’s bid-ask measure, but we are not able to conclude if the 
improvement in liquidity is due to this benchmark or other aspects. The same applies for the 
impact of new regulations and the reversal of the Swap Agreement, as we are not able to state 
what effects these developments have had on the liquidity improvement.   
1.4 Structure of the paper 
We will begin by presenting earlier research conducted on the subject, to set the frame for our 
contribution to the topic. In order to give the reader a good starting point for understanding 
the Scandinavian covered bond markets, we follow up by introducing the theory of bonds, in 
particular bonds backed by mortgages that have many of the same advantages as covered 
bonds. We then move on to describing covered bonds and government bonds in more detail 
before we examine the market for these bonds in the three Scandinavian countries. The last 
section dedicated to background information of the market is about regulation, which is very 
important in a highly regulated financial sector. The methodology chapter is dedicated to 
liquidity, hereby a definition and a discussion about what it is and how to measure it. Lastly, 
we present and discuss our data and results, criticism and our conclusions.  
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2. Review of previous literature 
Papers combining the activity in the secondary Norwegian covered bond market and liquidity 
analysis are very few. To our knowledge the only authors that have looked into this before us 
are Rakkestad, Skjeltorp and Ødegaard (2012) who analyze the liquidity in the Norwegian 
bond market. However, they do not compare the liquidity of the Norwegian market to other 
bonds in for example Denmark or Sweden. Furthermore, due to the covered bond market 
being very young at the time their paper was written, the time span of their data set is very 
short. Buchholst, Gyntelberg and Sangill (2010) have written a paper with longer data series 
on the Danish market. Even though they have longer time series of data, these authors also 
solely look at the domestic market and do not compare it to other international peers. 
Other papers written about the Norwegian covered bond markets are three master theses 
written by Norwegian students. The oldest is written by law student Myhre (2006) who takes 
a juridical approach to the topic. The other two are written at Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH) during spring of 2013. Martinsen (2013) goes into the details of the 
institutional aspects of the Norwegian covered bond market and about how the security is 
priced. In the other thesis, Jørum and Hjermann (2013) discuss the effects of the introduction 
of covered bonds in Norway on Norwegian banks’ capital structure.  
Consequently, our analysis differs in that we look at the secondary market of Norwegian 
covered bonds and that we compare the results with other domestic markets.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Bonds and bond pricing 
According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2003) a bond is a security that is issued in connection 
with a borrowing agreement, where the borrower is obligated to make specified payments to 
the bondholder on specified dates. The payments are called coupons and can either be 
floating or fixed. At the end of the period, at maturity, the borrower has to pay back the debt 
equal to the par value. A bullet loan is always repaid at maturity, while a callable bond might 
be repaid earlier. All these terms are written in the bond indenture, which is the bond’s 
contract. Subsequently to an issue, many bonds are listed on an exchange, where they later 
can be traded among investors. 
Bodie et. al. (2003) introduce in their book a formula on how to value a coupon bond. The 
formula is as follows: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ∑
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
+
𝑃𝑎𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
 
Equation 1: Bond valuation 
The formula is made up by four components; Coupon, time t, par value and the interest rate r. 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑡 refers to the coupon paid each period t and the par value is the value that the 
investor is promised to receive at maturity. In valuation practice, the par value is usually set 
to 100 and t depends on the maturity and payment structure of the bond. Although these two 
components are more or less straightforward, the other two – coupon and the interest rate 𝑟 – 
are more complex and thus will be discussed in the following parts. 
3.1.1 Coupon 
Coupon-paying bonds have either a fixed or floating rate coupon, meaning that the coupon 
paid to bondholders each period is respectively fixed by a contract or settled based on an 
underlying interest rate plus a fixed premium (Bjerksund and Stensland, 2014). The premium 
is mainly set by two aspects; the risk profile (rating) of the bond and the market sentiment at 
the time the bond is issued. Consequently, the premium of bonds with different ratings and 
issue dates might vary considerably.  
In valuation, the future cash flows paid to bondholders are forecasted. In the fixed rate case, 
there is no uncertainty about the coupon payments, and the cash flows can easily be 
forecasted. In the floating rate case, however, the forecasting of the cash flows is more 
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complex. According to Bjerksund and Stensland (2014), there are different models to forecast 
the interest rate depending on which assumptions one takes on the distribution of the future 
interest rate. In the most primitive models, the interest rate is assumed to be normally 
distributed without drift1, while the more advanced models like the Black-Karasinski model 
“allows for volatility, mean reversion, and the central tendency of the short rate to depend on 
time” (Tuckman and Serrat, 2012)2.  
The main understanding from this part is that forecasting the coupon of a fixed rate bond is 
simple, but the process is much more difficult for the floating rate case. For our analysis, we 
only value fixed rate coupon bonds so it is not necessary to go into more detail about floating 
rate coupon bonds. 
3.1.2 Interest rate 
The 𝑟 in the model is important when valuing bonds and is normally called the yield to 
maturity (YTM). Hence, 𝑟 provides information about what return investors require until 
maturity for a given bond (Bondie et al., 2003). In the following part we will present two 
methods of calculating YTM. The methods are relevant because in a later chapter it will be 
applied when valuing some of the covered bonds in our data set. 
 
Figure 1: Yield curve 
                                                          
1 Drift is a phenomenon that is similar to a trend 
2 See chapter 9: The Art of Term Structure Models :Drift (page 251)  and chapter 10: The Art of Term Structure 
Models: Volatility and Distribution (page 275) 
Page 14 
 
In order to explain the first method we use an example where there are three zero-coupon 
bonds with interest rates 𝑟1, 𝑟2and 𝑟3 and maturity at time 1, 2 and 3 respectively (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, there is an assumption that all bonds in the economy have the same risk profile 
and all bonds are priced correctly. By using the information we have on these three bonds we 
can find the YTM of a coupon-paying bond with maturity 1, 2 and 3 by 
(1 + 𝑦𝑡𝑚)3 = (1 + 𝑟1) ∗ (1 + 𝑟2) ∗ (1 + 𝑟3) 
 
𝒀𝑻𝑴 =  √(𝟏 + 𝒓𝟏) ∗ (𝟏 + 𝒓𝟐) ∗ (𝟏 + 𝒓𝟑)
𝟑
− 𝟏 
Equation 2: Yield-to-maturity (YTM) 
The second method is in the case where solely information about the last traded price of the 
bond (?̅?) and future coupons paid to bondholders3 are observable. For a similar bond as the 
one presented in the first example the pricing formula would look like this: 
?̅? =
𝐶1
(1 + 𝑟1)
+
𝐶2
(1 + 𝑟2)2
+
𝐶3
(1 + 𝑟3)3
=
𝐶1
(1 + 𝑦𝑡𝑚)
+
𝐶2
(1 + 𝑦𝑡𝑚)2
+
𝐶3
(1 + 𝑦𝑡𝑚)3
 
Equation 3: Bond price with use of YTM 
This cubic function is not easy to solve by hand, but by using Microsoft Excel’s Goal Seek 
function this is no problem.  
The two previous examples show that by using the bond pricing formula (Equation 2 and 3) it 
is possible to obtain key information about the bond that is not available at first hand. For our 
analysis, we have price data so especially the second method will be used later in this paper. 
3.2 Securitization  
In order to understand the covered bond market it is helpful to start with an explanation of 
securitization. Although covered bonds are not included in the definition of bonds issued 
through securitization, there are many similarities between the two types of securities that 
explain the motivation behind issuing covered bonds. According to Jobst (2008), 
securitization is the process of transforming non-tradable assets into tradable securities. 
Financial institutions securitize assets by picking a selection of assets to place in a cover pool. 
This pool is transferred to special entities where interest-bearing securities are issued to 
finance the pooled assets. Bond investors receive fixed or floating rate payments generated by 
                                                          
3 In real life this would only be the case for a fixed rate bond as discussed earlier 
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the underlying cover pool of assets. For a pool of assets to be suitable for securitization, it 
should be sufficiently large and homogenous, allowing for statistical analysis used for rating 
and risk assessment. The assets need to be sufficiently secure to receive a high credit rating 
without the backing of the original lender (Giddy, 2001). There should also be a good record 
of rates, defaults and prepayments, for it to be as attractive as possible for investors. 
There are several advantages with securitization. Firstly, it improves the liquidity of assets 
held by financial institutions because of limited secondary markets for most assets that are 
not securitized. It also enables small investors to purchase small proportions of the bonds 
issued, and hence give them the possibility to buy into assets in which they would otherwise 
not have enough capital to invest. The improved liquidity also makes it easier for investors to 
sell their bonds in the secondary market, which contributes to reducing the required rate of 
return for a bond (Saunders and Cornett, 2014). 
Further, financial institutions are often able to raise funds more cheaply through 
securitization. If a bank has high quality assets on their balance sheet, but a higher overall 
risk level, they can transfer the high quality assets to a separate entity. By also backing the 
asset base with a high level of equity, the entity will get a higher credit rating than the bank, 
and will be able to issue bonds at lower costs. Entities established for this purpose also have a 
much less complicated structure than most banks, which further reduces the risk associated 
with the bonds issued and improves the credit rating of the issuer. This high rating makes the 
bonds accessible for more investors. Pension funds and other mutual funds often have 
restrictions on the riskiness of their investments. The risk of their portfolio is reduced by 
including low risk bonds in their portfolio (Saunders and Cornett, 2014). High quality 
investments are also needed to comply with liquidity and solidity requirements relevant for 
financial institutions. Securitization also leads to advantages in management of credit and 
liquidity risk management, in that it can be traded quickly. 
3.3 Asset backed securities 
Asset backed security (ABS) is a product of securitization, and shares many of the 
characteristics with other types of bonds. In large, there are two types of ABSs; those issued 
by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and those issued by a Structured Investment Vehicle 
(SIV). 
SPVs are special entities set up by financial institutions who select a pool of assets (most 
often residential mortgages) which are sold to the SPV. Securities are created, which are 
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backed by cash flows from the underlying assets. The ABSs are sold to investors, who then 
own the right to the cash flows from these underlying assets. The SPV earns fees from the 
creation and servicing of the ABSs, while the money received from the borrower of the 
underlying assets is passed through the SPV to the investors. The life of the SPV is limited to 
the maturity of the underlying assets (Saunders and Cornett, 2014).  
In contrast to an SPV, SIVs issue bonds in order to raise cash to purchase a pool of loans 
from the mother bank, and hold these on the balance sheet until maturity. The bonds issued 
are backed by the pool of assets. An SIV shares many characteristics with a bank in that it 
issues bonds to fund mortgages. It cannot however issue deposits, and is hence not 
technically a bank. Unlike SPV, the investors do not have a direct claim to the cash flows 
produced by the underlying mortgages, but receive payments according to the terms agreed to 
when the bonds were issued. The issuer keeps the spread between the amount paid to the 
bondholders and the amount received from the borrowers. SIVs often have lines of credit 
from the mother bank, which is therefore still exposed to risk of the assets (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2014).  
3.4 Covered bonds 
Covered bonds (COVB) differ from bonds created through securitization in a few aspects. 
According to ECBC4 (2008) there is no clear consensus about the definition of a covered 
bond in the European context, but there are some common features that all agree on: 
1. Only licensed credit institutions are allowed to issue covered bonds. They are 
thoroughly monitored by a national regulator and are the legal unit to which the 
bondholder has a direct claim in an event of default. 
2. The bondholders have a claim on both the issuer and the cover pool, which is referred 
to as dual recourse. Covered bondholders have priority over unsecured debt holders 
of the credit institution in an event of default. 
3. The credit institution needs to maintain a sufficient amount of assets in the cover pool 
and the value has to exceed the claim of the current bond holders at all time. The 
practice is often referred to as the balance principle.  
                                                          
4 European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) was established in 2004. Its purpose is to represent and promote the 
interest of the European covered bond market participants at the international level and its main objective is to 
operate as the point of reference for matters regarding the industry. For more info see http://ecbc.hypo.org/. 
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4. The credit institution is on a running basis obliged to have its cover pool monitored by 
a public or other independent body. 
Before moving on and presenting a brief history of the covered bond practice, and later 
presenting the three Scandinavian covered bond markets in detail, there are some terms and 
aspects related to the list just presented that are necessary to explain in more detail. 
3.4.1 Direct claim to the credit institution 
As mentioned in point 2 in the list above, a direct claim is also called a full recourse right or 
dual recourse. This means that the bondholders’ claims are not only covered by the cover 
pool (see next point) but also by the credit institution directly (ECBC, 2008). It is hence the 
credit institution that is exposed to the underlying risk of the mortgaged assets, and hence 
makes the bond more secure for an investor. This point differentiates covered bonds from 
ABS that are sold and removed from the balance sheet, where the bondholders’ claim is not 
to the institution that issued the security but solely towards the underlying assets (Rakkestad, 
Bakke and Dahl, 2010). Consequently, investors in covered bonds are not directly exposed to 
the risk related to changes in the underlying assets’ values, since the issuer is required to 
follow the balance principle.  
The fact that investors in covered bonds are less exposed to the changing value of the 
underlying assets is important both for the attractiveness from investors with low risk appetite 
and for the general financial stability. According to the BIS5 Annual Report (2009) one of the 
main reasons for the outbreak of the financial crisis starting in 2007 was the moral hazard that 
occurred with the possibility of issuing debt and later being able to remove the related claim 
and assets from the balance sheet.  
3.4.2 Cover pool 
Point 3 in the list above introduces the term cover pool. Each covered bond has an attached 
cover pool of assets that according to the balance principle has to exceed the value of the debt 
at all times. The purpose of the cover pool is to limit the downside of the investment by 
assuring the bondholders that they will be repaid by the proceeds from selling the assets in 
the cover pool in a case of default. Since the cover pool of mortgages must exceed the value 
of the bonds by a margin, new mortgages are included if some are repaid or default. Asset 
backed securities are on the other hand backed by a fixed set of mortgages, and if a mortgage 
                                                          
5 Bank for International Settlement (BIS) represents 60 member central banks all around the world. The mission 
of BIS is to serve its members in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability. For more info: www.bis.org. 
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is repaid early or defaults, it will not be replaced. Since the pool of mortgages in ABS is 
fixed, they are often divided into different tranches according to the riskiness of the bonds. 
Such division is not possible for covered bonds, since the pool of mortgages constantly 
change in order to exceed the value of the issued covered bond at all times.  
The regulations encompassing what kind of assets that can be included in the cover pool of 
covered assets are strict, so the credit institution cannot include arbitrary assets in the cover 
pool. Although most countries’ regulations are similar in terms of their general strictness, 
there are distinctive features in every national regulation6 depending on its market’s structure 
and size (Rakkestad et al., 2010). Furthermore, in order assure that the value of the cover pool 
is correctly estimated, there needs to be done continuous mark-to-market valuations by a third 
party. In practice, this means that an external company evaluates the loans in the cover pool. 
Some countries also do stress tests of the underlying asset values to further assure the 
investors of the securities’ quality (Bruun-Kallum and Holberg, 2012). 
Residential and commercial mortgages are examples of cover assets that can be included in a 
cover pool. As emphasized earlier, national regulations usually vary. That also goes for what 
kinds of assets that are eligible for covered bond pools in different countries. ECBC (2014) 
presents an aggregated display of all issued European covered bonds by underlying assets 
denominated in Euros (EUR).  
Figure 2: Outstanding volume of European covered bonds by underlying asset in EUR (ECBC, p.109, 2014)  
In the period 2004-2006 most underlying assets were public sector debt (Figure 2). In the 
following period public sector loans continued to represent an important part, but in 2007, 
                                                          
6 For more detailed discussion see the presentation of the Scandinavian markets  
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mortgages took over as the biggest asset class used as underlying assets and has dominated 
since. Other assets as referred to in the figure are for example covered bonds issued by some 
Turkish banks that are backed by loans of small and midsize enterprises (Fuchs and Paciotti, 
2013). Even though the range of eligible cover assets are defined by each country’s 
regulation, covered bonds backed by mortgage loans are accepted in all countries with a 
covered bond system, and are the most common type of cover asset (ECBC, 2014).  
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4. Covered and government bond markets 
4.1 History of covered bonds 
The concept covered bonds has its origin in Europe, where the ancient Greeks were the first 
to take use of a similar structured debt security (ECBC, 2014). The decisive milestones for 
the development of what we today call covered bonds were laid in the old Prussia7 in the late 
18th century. Mortgage institutions in this epoch were the first to issue types of bonds where 
the investors had direct coverage in a cover pool (Rakkestad, et. al., 2010). In more recent 
years, most European countries have followed suit and developed their own covered bonds 
system. 
 
Figure 3: The origin of national regulations for European countries by 2014 (ECBC, p.105, 2014) 
Figure 3 provides an overview of all the European countries that today have a covered bond 
legislation and the year of when latest practice took effect. In addition to already mentioned 
Germany, countries like Denmark, Switzerland and Spain have long-lasting traditions with 
use of covered bonds. For the rest of the European countries the legislation that is effective 
per October 2014 is fairly young, and no more than 10 to 15 years old. 
                                                          
7 The geographic area that today is known as Germany 
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Figure 4: Outstanding covered bonds per 31 December 2012 by country (ECBC, p.515, 2014) 
Figure 4 supports the statement that covered bonds are mainly a European phenomenon. 
Although there are several countries outside Europe that have established covered bond 
markets, the combined outstanding volume is small in comparison with the aggregated 
European volume. Another point worth noticing is that the countries with the longest covered 
bond history such as Germany, Denmark and Spain also have the largest markets in terms of 
outstanding volume. 
Covered bonds are perceived as very safe, which often leads to a strong credit rating8. In 
Germany, there has not been a defaulted covered bond since 1769, and in Denmark, Spain 
and France there are no registered defaults since the establishment of their covered bonds 
systems (Rakkestad et al., 2010). Extremely low default rates are likely to be one of the 
reasons why covered bonds recently were classified as High Quality Liquid Assets Level 1 by 
the European Commission as part of the Liquidity Coverage Requirement (European 
Commission, 2014)9. Level 1 is the highest liquidity rating an asset can obtain within the 
European liquidity regulation and this outcome shows the important position covered bonds 
have in the European financial markets in 2014. 
 
 
                                                          
8 AAA is the highest credit rating possible assigned by the rating agencies Standard & Poors and Fitch. The 
third major rating agency Moody’s and their notification is Aaa. A high rating basically means that the 
probability of repayment is high. 
9 See the chapter concerning regulation for more discussion  
Page 22 
 
4.2 Government Bonds 
4.2.1 What are government bonds? 
In order to do a thorough assessment of the liquidity in secondary covered bond markets, we 
compare these to government bonds. Government bonds are interest-bearing securities issued 
by a national government. Government debt can be issued as bills or bonds, depending on the 
maturity of the security. Bonds are papers with maturity of more than one year (Norges Bank, 
2003), which we will focus most on due to the closest resemblance to Scandinavian covered 
bonds. The coupon rate of a government bond normally reflects the market rate at the time it 
is issued. National governments are in most cases regarded to have high credit worthiness, 
and such bonds therefore tend to receive a high rating from credit rating agencies. 
Government bonds are usually only backed by the faith and credit worthiness of the issuing 
country and not by any assets (The World Bank, 2001). The European debt crisis, where 
several European countries struggled with high levels of debt and difficulties fulfilling their 
obligations, served as a reminder that there is also risk associated with government debt. Due 
to uncertainty in alternative investments, demand for government bonds rise in unstable 
times.  
4.2.2 Functions of government bonds 
The most obvious function of government bonds is to finance a country’s budget deficit. 
Further, it might help in implementing wanted monetary policies, and reach monetary goals 
as well as smoothing consumption and adverse shocks to the economy. The interest rate is 
commonly used as a measure of the return on a risk free placement, as it is often the best 
approximation of such an investment (The World Bank, 2001). Government bonds have an 
increasingly important function in managing credit and liquidity risk in financial institutions. 
Since government bonds are considered very safe investments, they are important for 
reducing overall risk on such institution’s balance sheet. Recent capital and liquidity 
regulation developments emphasize the importance of such secure investments. That will be 
discussed further in the section on regulation. 
In some countries where there is no need to finance a budget deficit, government bonds are 
usually still issued. This is the case in Norway where the non-oil budget deficit of the 
national budget is financed by transfers from The Government Pension Fund Global10. Bonds 
                                                          
10 A sovereign wealth fund owned by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Norwegian people, 
where surplus wealth from the petroleum sector is deposited 
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are still issued to balance the money market, the government’s access to cash and due to 
value gained from issuing bonds (Ministry of Finance, 2014). Issuing government bonds on a 
regular basis also supply investors with an approximation of the interest rate on risk free 
investments with various maturities.   
As for bonds in general, liquidity in government bonds is important to minimize the price the 
issuing country has to pay for funding. Low liquidity will lead to investors demanding a 
higher compensation when investing in such bonds. A small market, low liquidity, and 
investors with relatively inelastic demand might also lead to a scarcity premium11 for 
government bonds. In that case, the yield is not a good proxy for a risk free yield curve (Hein, 
2003).  
                                                          
11 Scarcity premium refers to the increased price on a security due to demand being much larger than supply  
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5.  Scandinavian bond markets 
5.1 Scandinavian government bond markets 
In the primary market in Scandinavia, government bonds are sold through auctions. Bonds 
are assigned at the highest price that on an aggregate allocates the whole value of the bonds. 
There are primary dealers who are required to quote bid and ask prices through the day in all 
secondary government bond markets (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2013; Norström, 2011; 
Norges Bank, 2014). This is likely to increase liquidity by allowing buyers to monitor price 
changes and trade at known prices. Secondary trades in Scandinavian government bonds are 
conducted through the domestic stock exchange, different electronic trading platforms or 
over-the-counter (OTC). Yield series on government bonds in all Scandinavian countries are 
presented later in the paper.  
 
Figure 5: Outstanding volumes in government bonds in Scandinavian countries from 2007 to 2014 
As can be seen in Figure 5, the size of the Danish and Swedish government bond markets is 
quite similar, currently between EUR 80 and 100 billion. The Norwegian government bond 
market is smaller at EUR 40 billion. The government bond markets are smaller than the 
respective covered bond markets in all the Scandinavian countries. Since 2007, all markets 
have increased in size, but the largest relative increases have been in the Danish and 
Norwegian market.  
5.2 Scandinavian covered bond markets 
In the following parts, we will present the three Scandinavian covered bond markets in more 
detail. When we later present the findings on liquidity for the different markets, it is useful to 
have in mind the markets’ characteristics such as size, history and institutional aspects. From 
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what has already been presented, it is clear that the covered bond market in Denmark is both 
bigger and has a longer history than the Swedish and Norwegian market, and such 
characteristics might have an influence on the liquidity of the market.  
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Type of covered bond 
Obligasjoner med 
fortrinnsrett 
Säkerställda obligationer 
 Særligt Dækkede 
Obligationer 
 Særligt Dækkede 
Realkreditobligationer 
 Realkreditobligationer 
Updated legislation 1 June 2007 1 July 2004 1 July 2007 
Number of issuers 26 10 14 
Requirement for 
“Specialized 
Mortgage credit 
institutions” 
Yes No No 
Eligible cover assets 
 Residential and 
commercial 
mortgages 
 Public Loans 
 Derivatives 
 Substitute assets 
 Residential, farm and   
commercial mortgages 
 Public loans 
 Derivatives 
 Substitute assets 
 Loan secured by real 
property 
 Public authority loan 
 Credit institution 
loan*** 
 Ship collateral*** 
 Substitute assets 
Substitute asset 
proportion of total 
cover pool 
20% 20% 15% 
Required 
overcollateralization 
No No 8%**** 
Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority 
Finanstilsynet (NO) Finansinspektionen Finanstilsynet (DK) 
LTV-values 
 75 % residential 
mortgage 
 60% commercial 
mortgage 
 75% residential 
mortgage 
 70% farm mortgage 
 60% commercial 
mortgage 
 80% residential*  
 60% commercial 
mortgage* 
Marketplace 
 Oslo Børs 
 ABM 
 Nasdaq OMX Sweden 
 First North Sweden 
 Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
 First North Denmark 
Market makers No** Yes Yes 
Table 1: Main features of the three Scandinavian covered bonds markets 
*         It depends on the type of covered bonds but these are most common percentages 
**       For the Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark there are quoted prices 85% of the day 
***     Only the case for Særligt Dækkede Obligationer 
****   Mandatory only for mortgage banks 
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5.3 Covered bonds – Norway 
5.3.1 History 
The Norwegian covered bond market is a young market where the current legislation took 
effect 1 June 200712 (Bruun-Kallum and Holberg, 2012). Since then the market has 
experienced a tremendous growth and per 31 December 2013 it was the eighth biggest 
covered bond market in the world in terms of outstanding volume (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 6: Development of the Norwegian bond market from 2008 until 2014 (Tveit, 2014) 
As a result of the strong growth, covered bonds have also obtained the position as one of the 
most important bond types in the Norwegian bond market (Figure 6). The Norwegian type of 
covered bond is called “Obligasjon med fortrinnsrett” (OMF) and from representing only 6% 
in 2008 it stands for 31% of the total Norwegian bond market in 2014. From the figure we 
can firmly state that senior bank bonds have experienced the largest decreased share. The 
reason for this is that banks have changed their capital structure towards more covered bond 
funding (Jørum and Hjermann, 2013). 
5.3.2 Requirements 
In order to issue covered bonds in Norway a bank needs to fully or partly own a specialized 
mortgage credit institution approved by the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FSA)13 (Norwegian FSA, 2014). Loans are moved from the balance sheet of the bank to the 
                                                          
12 This new legislation was an evolution of the 2004 legislation for “Obligasjonslån med pantesikkerhet i 
utlånsportefølje”. The reason for the new legislation was partly to improve the funding conditions for 
Norwegian financial institutions and to reduce the maturity gap on funding and lending activities. 
13 Finanstilsynet 
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credit institution’s balance sheet, before the credit institution issues covered bonds with the 
transferred loans as cover assets. The raised funds are then used to repay the bank for the 
transferred loans that the credit institution now formally owns. Since the credit institution is 
fully of partly owned by the bank, they are the same unit on a consolidated level, and have 
strong incentives to uphold the solidity of the institution in case of financial distress. This 
structure provides transparency and it is easier for the FSA to monitor, which is one of the 
main drivers for why establishing a specialized mortgage credit institution is required 
(Finance Norway, 2014). 
For the Norwegian OMF, the following assets are eligible to take part of the cover pool 
(ECBC, p. 355, 2014): 
 Residential and commercial mortgages (respectively LTV14 < 75% and 60%) 
 Public sector loans 
 Loans secured on other registered assets 
 Assets in form of derivative agreements 
 Substitute assets (maximum 20% of the cover pool’s value) 
Residential and commercial mortgages are related to residential and commercial real estate 
respectively. Bonds backed by public sector-loans constitute a very small part of the 
outstanding volume of bonds, and the only issuer is KLP Kommunekreditt that issues bonds 
covered with municipality debt (Finance Norway, 2014). No Norwegian covered bonds are 
backed with loans secured by other registered assets, so this will not be explained further. 
According to Martinsen (2013), derivatives used to hedge against interest rate and currency 
risks are usually included in the Norwegian credit institutions’ cover pools. The last point on 
the list of assets that are eligible for the cover pool is substitute assets. According to 
Norwegian FSA (2014) examples of such assets are highly marketable assets with low risk 
like bank deposits or other especially liquid and safe securities. This type of assets cannot 
make up more than 20% of the cover pool’s value15. 
As other covered bonds, Norwegian OMF is closely monitored and regulated. In order for the 
residential mortgages to count as a cover asset, the total loan value of the mortgage needs to 
be 75% or less of the market value of the underlying asset. In other words, if a credit 
                                                          
14 Loan-to-value (LTV) is a percentage that says how much of the market value of the asset that is leveraged 
15 With special permission by the FSA the percentage can be increased to 30% (Norwegian FSA, 2014)  
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institution wants to increase the cover pool, the value of an added residential mortgage will 
only be eligible if the loan value is 75% or less of the market value of the related estate. For 
commercial mortgages, the LTV has to be equal to or less than 60%. To determine the market 
value of an estate, credit institutions use an independent third party called Eiendomsverdi 
(Finance Norway, 2014). There are several ways to value a house, but only the value 
provided by Eiendomsverdi is valid in regard to the regulation. 
5.3.3 Issuers 
Although Norwegian issuers have the possibility to denominate bonds in both domestic and 
foreign currency, the general practice is that only the biggest issuers make use of the 
international capital markets (Bruun-Kallum and Holberg, 2012). Furthermore, issuers can 
choose to issue covered bonds with a floating or fixed interest rate. In Norway, there is a 
strong tradition of financing houses with a floating rate mortgage. Since the majority of 
Norwegian covered bonds have residential mortgages as cover assets, credit institutions also 
prefer floating rate funding16. However, important investor groups like pension and insurance 
funds prefer fixed rate bonds. Norwegian credit institutions have solved this by entering 
interest rate swap agreements when issuing fixed rate bonds (Rakkestad et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 7: Outstanding volume of the Norwegian NOK market by issuer 30 September 2014 (Stamdata database17) 
Figure 7 presents the issuers in the Norwegian market, by outstanding volume (left y-axis) 
and numbers (right y-axis) of fixed and floating rate bonds. “Others” represent the smallest 
                                                          
16 In order not to be exposed for interest rate risk the cost (funding) and the income (lending) should vary 
equally, and this is why Norwegian issuers do not want to have floating income but fixed costs 
17 For more information see http://www.stamdata.no 
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issuers in the market. The market is fragmented and the list counts 26 Norwegian18 issuers in 
total, where Nordea Eiendomskreditt AS is the biggest in term of NOK issued covered bonds. 
The four largest issuers stand for about 56% of the total market, while the smaller issuers 
together make up a large share of the outstanding value, and especially the number of bonds 
issued. As a natural consequence, which can be seen from Figure 7, the bonds issued by the 
largest issuers are larger on average. The size of such a bond is normally increased by the use 
of tap issues19. 
5.3.4 Development in turnover 
 
Figure 8: Trading activity in Norwegian covered bond marketplaces20 
                                                          
18 There are covered bonds from 23 credit institutions listed in Norway, but Stadshypotek AB, Skandiabanken 
AB and Swedbank Hypotek AB are Swedish and thus not included in the Norwegian list 
19 This is the opposite of a pre-issuance issue where the whole loan frame is filled before the issue date. A tap-
issue bond makes it possible for the issuer to increase its loan to the market on an ongoing basis. 
20 For more information see http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics/Monthly-statistics 
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As the market has grown in terms of outstanding volume, the secondary market activity has 
followed. Part a) of Figure 8 shows that the turnover has increased a lot over the last years, 
where Oslo Børs is playing the major role. Part b) shows more or less the same development 
– the number of trades has increased significantly since 2007 and a repo21 market has been 
established, which indicates that the market is getting more mature. In terms of number of 
transactions, Alternative Bond Market (ABM) stands for one third of the activity level of the 
main marketplace Oslo Børs, and in terms of trading volume, Oslo Børs is even bigger and 
more important. 
5.3.5 Investors 
Figure 9: Norwegian marketplace and division of investors22 
There are two main marketplaces for covered bonds; Oslo Børs (OSE) and ABM, where 
ABM has fewer listing requirements. As can be seen from part a) of Figure 9, most bonds are 
listed on OSE. Most Norwegian covered bonds are listed23 (Bruun-Kallum and Holberg, 
2012), but the majority of trades are done off the exchange and then reported to the exchange 
afterwards24 (Finance Norway, 2014). The Norwegian market consists of a broad 
composition of market participants. Among these are banks, pension and insurance funds as 
well as other types of funds. Norwegian banks are the largest investor with 41%, but 
mortgage institutions and various funds also own large shares of the Norwegian covered 
bonds market (Figure 9, part b). 
                                                          
21 Repurchase agreement is an agreement between two parties where one party sells his asset to another party 
with an agreement to buy it back after a short period 
22 For mor information see https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selecttable/hovedtabellHjem.asp? 
KortNavnWeb=vpstat&CMSSubjectArea=bank-og-finansmarked&checked=true 
23 According to our data set around 20 covered bonds denominated in NOK are not listed 
24 Trades that take place off the exchange needs to be reported to the Oslo Børs within five minutes after the 
trade has taken place. In markets with market makers this time limit can sometimes be postponed until the end 
of the trading day so that the broker can unload some of his/her exposure in the market (Hein, 2003). 
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5.3.6 Historic yields 
 Figure 10: Overview of yield series for Norwegian covered bonds 
The last part of the presentation of the Norwegian covered bond market is an overview of 
historical yield series (Figure 10). Part a) shows the yield development of 3-year floating rate 
OMF compared to the yield of government bills, which is normally considered as the risk free 
rate. In part b) we show the different risk premiums above NIBOR25 3 month for senior bank 
loans for respectively a BBB rated small savings bank, some corporations rated A-, a bigger 
savings bank rated A+ and AAA-rated OMF. The last graphs are shown in part c) where we 
present the difference in risk premiums for floating rate OMFs with different maturities.  
Before starting on the presentation of the Swedish covered bond market we will present a 
more detailed discussion on two events that we believe have influenced or will influence the 
activity in the Norwegian covered bond market. 
5.3.7 The Government Swap Agreement 
The government swap agreement, or “Bytteordningen” was a reaction to the tougher 
financing situations for Norwegian banks during the financial crisis starting in 2007 
(Rakkestad et al., 2010). In practice, the agreement was a facility where the credit institutions 
could issue and then swap covered bonds for government bills, which had a higher 
                                                          
25 The Norwegian money market interest rate, which also is the main reference rate in Norway 
a) Yield series of  floating rate 3-year OMF and Norwegian 
government notes (Tveit, 2014)
b) Risk premiums above NIBOR 3M for different 5-year floating rate 
Norwegian bonds (Tveit, 2014)
c) Risk premiums above NIBOR 3M for floating rate OMFs with 
different times to maturity (Berg, Rakkestad and Skjeltorp, 2014)
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recognition in financial markets. On mission from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the 
Norwegian Central Bank administrated the agreement, meaning that they were in charge of 
the swaps and the terms for each agreement. The agreement was passed by the Norwegian 
parliament on 24 October 2008 and the terms of the last swap agreement was made on 17 
December 2009 (Norges Bank, 2013). The maximum length of a swap period was 5 years 
and the price was decided by the market participants quoting prices for government bills. 
During the swap period, the covered bonds were in practice taken out of the market and kept 
on the government’s account with the central bank. When reversing the swap agreement the 
credit institutions got back the covered bonds in exchange for the government securities. 
Consequently, the covered bonds returned to the secondary market and the outstanding 
volume of bonds in the market increased. The last reversal of the agreement was 18 June 
2014.  
Figure 11: Development of issued covered bonds and composition of Norwegian government debt 
In order to track the phasing in of the swap agreement we can look at Figure 11 where part a) 
shows the total amount of outstanding covered bonds by issue type. Part b) displays the 
development of the Norwegian government debt. The effect of the government swap 
agreement can be seen by the big increase of the green column in part a) in 2009. This means 
that even if the outstanding volume of issued OMFs increased a lot, the total volume of 
outstanding bonds traded in secondary market did not increase as much. The same increase is 
shown in the green column in part b) for the same year. Combined the two figures tell us that 
the government issued bills and swapped them for covered bonds. The reversal of the 
agreement can be seen from the reduction of the two green columns in part a) and b) towards 
2014.  
5.3.8 The Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark 
The Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark was established in June 2014 and consists of a 
selection of the covered bonds listed on Oslo Børs. The benchmark was introduced on 
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demand from several institutions. Credit institutions for example requested such a list to 
enhance the availability of covered bonds and thus attract more investors. The benchmark is 
limited in the way that only covered bonds determined by certain characteristics are included 
(Borchgrevink, 2014): 
 Oslo Børs bonds registered in VPS26 and denominated in NOK 
 Outstanding volume of at least NOK 2.5 billion  
 Minimum 10 investors 
The main purpose of the benchmark is to increase credit institution’s access to capital 
markets by opening it up to more investors. Up until the second half of 2014, there have not 
been market makers quoting bid and ask prices for Norwegian covered bonds. As part of the 
new benchmark there will be quoted two-way prices by market makers 85% of the day and 
indicative prices will be calculated at all times in an attempt to display the ongoing change in 
market value of each bond (Borchgrevink, 2014). The anticipated outcome is increased 
liquidity in the bonds that are included in the benchmark and a more transparent covered 
bond market. 
5.4 Covered bonds – Sweden 
 
5.4.1 History 
In resemblance to the Norwegian market, the Swedish covered bond market as we know 
today is quite young, but it is already one of the biggest covered bonds markets in the world 
(see Figure 4). The Swedish version of covered bonds is called ”Säkerställda obligationer” 
and the legislation Swedish Covered Bonds Issuance Act was effective from 1 July 2004 
(ECBC, p. 439, 2014). Up until 2006 most of the Swedish banks’ lending facilities were 
funded by mortgage bonds27 (Nilsson, 2013). As Norwegian OMF, Swedish covered bonds 
also have a cover pool in which the bondholders have a direct claim in case of default and the 
issuers are subject to balance principle regulation. As a part of the new Swedish legislation, 
Swedish FSA28 ordered all banks and mortgage credit institutions to convert their mortgage 
bonds into covered bonds in order to get an issuance license. Subsequently, all Swedish 
                                                          
26 Verdipapirsentralen (VPS) is the Norwegian Central Securities Depository. The company provides an 
efficient infrastructure and services for the settlement of transactions in securities and the registration of 
ownership rights over securities. For more information see www.vps.no. 
27 Mortgage bonds have been a frequent funding source for Swedish banks since the beginning of the 20th 
century (Sandström, Forsman, von Rosen and Wettergren, 2013) 
28 Finansinspektionen 
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mortgage bonds were converted into covered bonds in the period of 2006-2008 (Sandström, 
Forsman, von Rosen and Wettergren, 2013).  
5.4.2 Requirements  
In Sweden, the following assets are eligible for inclusion in cover pool (Sandström et al., 
2013): 
 Residential and farm property mortgages 
 Commercial mortgages (maximum 10% of the cover pool’s value) 
 Public loans 
 Substitute assets (maximum 20% of the cover pool’s value29) 
These are similar to the Norwegian requirements, also when it comes to the LTV 
requirements. The maximum LTV for residential, farm property and commercial mortgage is 
75%, 70% and 60% respectively. For substitute assets, it is accepted to include other banks’ 
issued covered bonds in addition to other highly liquid assets, such as cash and government 
securities (Sandström et al., 2013). 
5.4.3 Issuers 
 
 
Figure 12: Overview of the outstanding Swedish SEK market by issuer per 30 September 2014 (Stamdata database) 
The market for issuing covered bonds in Sweden is relatively concentrated with four big 
banks dominating the market (Figure 12). There are in total ten issuers which are usually 
                                                          
29 Can be increased on a temporary basis by the Swedish FSA 
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funded by the use of tap issues, leading to a market of few but large bond series30 (Sandström 
et al., 2013). In the figure, the blue and red show the amount of SEK outstanding (left-hand 
y-axis) and number of covered bonds issued (right-hand y-axis) respectively and where 
nuances of blue and red show the proportion of fixed rate and floating rate.  
5.4.4 Development in turnover 
 
 
Figure 13: Development of turnover in Swedish covered bonds (Riksbanken database31) 
Despite the fact that most bonds are listed on Nasdaq OMX Sweden32, the Swedish market is 
defined as a telephone market, which means that most of the trades are done by phone and 
thus off the exchange (Söderberg and Lindkvist, 2011). The market makers33 have an 
agreement with the authorities to report trades in which they have been involved every 
month, which is the data presented in Figure 13. The Swedish market has a relatively high 
turnover and repos play a very important part of the market activity. The Swedish covered 
bond market sustained a relatively high liquidity even under the recent financial crisis. One of 
the reasons is that there is a strong domestic investor base that can trade with market makers 
who quote two-ways prices on an ongoing basis during the whole trading day (Söderberg and 
Lindkvist, 2011). 
                                                          
30 These bonds are called “benchmarkobligationer”, and tap-issues are normally only done for these types of 
large bonds. Landshypotek AB for example does not have large enough bonds, so instead of tapping on a 
benchmark bond they issue smaller bonds on a running basis. 
31 For more information see http://www.riksbank.se/en/Statistics/Money-and-Bond-Markets/ 
32 In addition to this there is First North Sweden, but there are no listed covered bonds on this exchange. First 
North was newly established and is similar to the Norwegian ABM. 
33 Per 1 October 2014 there are eight market makers in the Swedish covered bond market: Swedbank, 
Handelsbanken, Nordea and SEB, Danske Bank, Nykredit, Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland 
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5.4.5 Investors  
 
Figure 14: Domestic holders of Swedish covered bonds per 31 December 2013 (Fremberg, 2014) 
The most important domestic investors in SEK denominated covered bonds are traditional 
long term investors, where insurance companies represent the biggest group with 39,2% of 
the market (Figure 14). Banks are also big investors due to their role as market makers, and in 
order to fulfill the regulations concerning liquidity buffers (Sandström et al., 2013). However, 
there are also many short term investors who are important for the liquidity in the second 
hand market. 
 
5.4.6 Historic yields 
 
Figure 15: Yield series on floating covered bond, government bonds and the Swedish central bank's repo rate 
(Nordea Markets Sweden34) 
As for the Norwegian market, we present yield series for covered bonds in Sweden (Figure 
15). The first two labels are covered bonds with 2- and 5-year maturity respectively. The next 
                                                          
34 Data received from Mats Hydén in Nordea Markets Sweden 
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two labels, represented by the grey and red line, are government bonds also with 2- and 5-
year maturity. The orange line is the repo rate offered by the central bank for short term 
deposits. The spread between covered bonds and government bonds was largest in 2010, but 
in recent years, it has come down to lower levels. 
5.5 Covered bonds – Denmark 
5.5.1 History 
Among the three Scandinavian covered bond markets, the Danish market is a “heavyweight”. 
In terms of outstanding volume, it is the second largest market in the world (Figure 4) and 
consists of more than 170035 covered bonds. Today’s system came into force on 1 July 2007 
and was motivated by the harmonization of covered bond legislations within the European 
Union (EU) through Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 1 (ECBC, p. 249, 2014). One of 
the main features of the new legislation was the opening for non-specialist banks to issue 
covered bonds (Sørensen et al., 2013). Danish FSA36 has the mandate of granting mortgage 
banks, commercial banks and ship financing institutions licenses to issue covered bonds, and 
is responsible for monitoring the issuers. 
5.5.2 Requirements and market characteristics 
Due to the size and significance of the Danish covered bond market, it requires strong 
regulatory institutions and a sophisticated legislation framework in order to work properly. 
Today there are in total three types of covered bonds issued in Denmark, differing by issuer 
characteristics and cover assets (ECBC, p. 249, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Data per 30 September 2014 from a dataset provided by Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
36 Finanstilsynet 
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Type of bond 
Særligt Dækkede 
Obligationer  
(SDO) 
Særligt Dækkede 
Realkreditobligationer 
(SDRO) 
Realkreditobligationer 
(RO) 
Allowed issuers Commercial or mortgage 
banks37 
Mortgage banks Mortgage banks 
Continuous LTV 
compliance 
Yes Yes No 
Fulfill CRD 
requirements 
Yes Yes No 
Eligible cover 
assets  
 Loan secured by real 
property 
 Public authority loan 
 Credit institution loan 
 Ship collateral 
 Substitute assets 
(<15%) 
 Loan secured by real 
property 
 Public authority loan 
 Substitute assets 
(15%) 
 Loan secured by real 
property 
 Public authority loan 
 Substitute assets 
(15%) 
Table 2: Overview of Danish covered bond types 
One of the most important differences between the three types of bonds presented in Table 2 
is that SDO and SDRO are “Særlig dækkede”, which refers to the continuous LTV 
compliance requirement38. At the time of issuance however, all bonds are required to have an 
LTV percentage of 80% and 60% for residential and commercial mortgages respectively 
included in the cover pool (Sørensen et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 16: Different types of Danish covered bonds as a percentage of the market (Statbank Denmark database39) 
                                                          
37 Danish mortgage banks (Realkreditinstitutter) operate subject to a special banking principle in accordance 
with Danish legislation, which confines the activities of issuers to the granting of mortgage loans funded by the 
issuance of covered bonds. Mortgage banks may also carry on other business related to mortgage banking. 
38 According to Nykredit (2010), RO does not fulfill the CRD requirement of continuous LTV compliance. This 
means that all ROs issued after 1 January 2008 are not considered as covered bonds. However, due to a clause in 
CRD all ROs issued before 1 January 2008 keep their covered bond status. 
39 A database run by Statistics Denmark with gathered data from the Danish National Bank. For more 
information see http://www.statbank.dk/2448 
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As can be seen from Figure 16, the covered bond market in Denmark has gone from 
consisting only of RO in the beginning of 2007, to SDO and SDRO making up about 80% of 
the market in 2014.  
The LTV ratio is closely monitored by the Danish FSA, and in distressed periods like the 
financial crisis, when real estate prices in Denmark fell by 20%, the issuers had to supply 
additional capital to the cover pool in order to satisfy the balance principle (Nykredit, 2010). 
Danish issuers are also subject to an obligation of overcapitalization40(OC) that amounts to a 
minimum of 8% of the risk-weighted capital41 (Sørensen et al., 2013). This OC requirement 
results in additional safety for investors on top of the LTV requirement.  
According to Nykredit (2010), the Danish covered bond system stands out in several aspects 
in comparison to the other European markets, and one of the most unique elements is the 
close link between lending and funding. This is materialized through a pass-through system 
similar to SPV, where issuers pass through all cash flows from the borrower to the 
bondholder and vice versa (Nykredit, 2010). If a bank customer is granted a loan, funds from 
a lender in the market are transferred to the customer. In the following period, all interest and 
installments are transferred back to the lender. The pass-through system is linked with an 
extensive use of tap issues, which according to Sørensen et al. (2013) is the most common 
way to issue covered bonds for Danish banks.  
                                                          
40 Overcapitalization is when the value of the cover pool is larger than the bond’s par value. This requirement is 
only valid for the issues mortgage banks and not for commercial banks (Martinsen, 2013). 
41 See the Regulation chapter for an explanation of this term 
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5.5.3 Issuers and bonds in the market 
Figure 17: Overview of the outstanding Danish DKK market by issuer per 30 September 2014 (Nasdaq OMX 
Denmark42) 
As a coherent consequence of its size, the absolute turnover is high in the Danish market, but 
during the financial crisis in 2008-2009, the secondary market liquidity experienced a minor 
drop. However, a strong legal and institutional framework supported Danish mortgage banks 
in issuing tap issues as normal (Sørensen et al., 2013), and according to Nykredit (2010) 
several countries have considered to implement parts of the Danish system because of this 
success. The 1700 Danish covered bonds are listed on Nasdaq OMX Denmark, and represent 
about 80% of all bonds listed on the exchange (Nasdaq OMX Denmark, 2014). Even though 
there is a vast amount of listed bonds, the marketplace is mainly made up by a group of fewer 
large bonds series where the 100 largest series comprise 68% of the total market. The 
concentration in the Danish market is quite high, with 14 issuers, where the two largest43 
stand for about 68% of all bonds issued (Figure 17). The secondary market is supported by 
seven44 markets makers that quote bid and ask prices for the listed covered bonds on request 
(Nykredit, 2010). The Danish market also offer several covered bond indices so investors can 
follow the developments in the market. 
                                                          
42 For more info see: http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/bonds/denmark 
43 Nykredit/Totalkredit and Realkredit Danmark 
44 Market makers are typically the largest Danish banks and one or more foreign stockbrokers 
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Figure 18: Characteristics of Danish covered bonds and underlying mortgages (Statbank Denmark database) 
Figure 18 presents an overview of the different types of Danish covered bonds in the market, 
as well as characteristics of the underlying mortgages. Danish covered bonds are either fixed 
or floating, and are backed by mortgages that also have either a fixed or an adjustable interest 
rate. In the latter case, the interest rate is adjusted at predetermined intervals of time, usually 
every year, every 3 years or every 5 years. Fixed rate mortgages usually have a maturity of 30 
years, but it might be less. As can be seen from Figure 18, floating rate bonds only make up a 
small proportion of the outstanding volume in the entire period. However, there has been a 
clear change from underlying mortgages with fixed rates to floating rates. As presented 
previously, the outstanding volume has increased since 2007, and is in October 2014 at about 
DKK 2500 billion. Over 80% of outstanding bonds now have a fixed interest rate. More than 
50% of these are however backed by floating rate mortgages. Of the underlying mortgages, 
one third is fixed while the rest is floating. There is still a clear preference of fixed rate bonds 
by investors.  
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5.5.4 Development in turnover 
Figure 19: Development of turnover and number of trades in Danish covered bonds (Nasdaq OMX Denmark)  
Figure 19 contains information about the trading volume and the number of trades executed 
from 2007 October 2014. The turnover and number of trades conducted in the period is 
relatively stable, and reflects the mature state of the Danish covered bond market. Further, the 
high turnover reflects the large size of the market. The numbers for 2014 are lower than the 
previous years, but because only data for the first nine months of the year is included, it is 
likely to end up quite similarly as the previous year.  
As can be seen from Figure 19, trades are carried out through on-exchange trading or in the 
OTC market. For OTC trades, the transaction45 needs to be reported to the Nasdaq OMX 
within three minutes after the trade has been conducted. The distribution of trades executed 
on Nasdaq OMX and OTC has changed a lot in the period. In 2007-2009, and especially in 
2008, a substantial part of the trades were made in the OTC market. According to Nasdaq 
OMX46, there are two reasons for this development. Firstly, in late 2007 buyers and sellers 
started to report their trading as OTC trades due to the introduction of new transparency 
regulations. That resulted in trades appearing as OTC trades in the subsequent years. 
Secondly, the stock exchange introduced a new pricing strategy in 2009, which incentivized 
buyers and sellers to report their trades manually to Nasdaq OMX, which thus are presented 
as on-exchange trades. These are however executed in the telephone market, and are in reality 
OTC trades. This is the case for most trades conducted, and the Danish market can in large be 
characterized as an OTC market.  
                                                          
45 If the trade size exceeds DKK 100 million the reporting trader my request non-disclosure until the close of the 
trading day (Nykredit, 2010) 
46 E-mail received from Nicolai Jeppesen in Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
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5.5.5 Investors 
 
Figure 20: Overview of investors in Danish DKK covered bonds (Statbank Denmark Database) 
Figure 20 presents the investor composition in Danish covered bonds, and displays that 
various financial institutions, including banks hold most bonds, while a non-negligible 
amount is also held by insurance and pension funds. Foreign investors hold 16% of the 
outstanding value, while domestic institutions hold 84%. Households and non-financial 
corporations only hold a very small proportion of the bonds.  
5.5.6 Historic yields 
Figure 19: Yield series for Danish covered bond, government bonds and the Danish central bank's deposit rate 
(Nordea Markets Denmark47) 
As for the two other Scandinavian countries, yield series for Danish securities are presented 
in Figure 21. Included are covered bonds and government bonds with 3-year and 5-year 
maturities, in addition to the Danish deposit interest rate. After a peak in 2008-2009, there has 
                                                          
47 Data received from Maria Holm Rasmussen in Nordea Markets Denmark 
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been a significant decline in yields for all securities, and a convergence close to a 0% interest 
rate. The deposit interest rate has experienced the lowest level of interest rates since 2009, 
with government bonds at slightly higher levels, and covered bonds at somewhat higher rates. 
The interest rate for 5-year securities has been higher than 3-year securities for both 
government and covered bonds.  
The three Scandinavian markets have now been presented for the reader. The presentations 
are relatively brief but provide sufficient information in order to do some comparisons, and to 
understand the size and structure of the different markets. This paper’s main focus is the 
secondary market liquidity for Scandinavian covered bonds, so the discussions represent 
relevant background information for the later analysis. In large, the Swedish and Norwegian 
markets have a similar structure, even though the Swedish market has a more concentrated 
group of issuers, where most of them also act as market makers. The Danish market has the 
longest history, is the biggest in terms of outstanding volume and turnover, and has the most 
sophisticated legislation. A common characteristic for the Swedish and Danish market is that 
they mainly constitute of large bond series and use of tap issues. The liquidity in the Swedish 
and Danish market suffered less than in the Norwegian market, where the government had to 
introduce a swap agreement in order to support and secure the funding of Norwegian banks.  
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6. Regulation 
6.1 Basel III – Introduction 
The global banking sector has been subject to increased attention and monitoring after the 
recent financial crisis. There is a clear consensus about the need for a more detailed 
regulation in order to minimize the probability of similar crisis in the future. Previous 
regulations48 did not work as planned, and a new and updated version of the Basel regulation, 
called Basel III, is being introduced. The point of including this chapter is to introduce the 
parts of the framework and other relevant regulations that might have or will have an impact 
on the liquidity in the Scandinavian covered bond markets.  
The main features of Basel III49 are to increase bank liquidity and decrease leverage and short 
term funding. The new accord will rather build on the earlier accords than replacing them 
(Basel Committee, 2011). The framework was agreed upon by the members50 of the Basel 
committee on Banking Supervision in 2010-2011, and will be phased in during 2013-2019 
(Appendix 1). In Europe, the Basel III recommendations will be implemented in the new 
directive called Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV and will be the prevailing directive 
for the Scandinavian markets. The new regulations are divided in the following parts: 
 Risk-weighted assets 
 Leverage ratio 
 Liquidity  
o Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
o Net Stable Funding Ratio 
Although they are all important in a regulatory sphere, our focus will be on risk-weighted 
assets and the liquidity measures since they are most relevant for liquidity in covered bonds. 
The new regulations are likely to both increase the demand for covered bonds as part of new 
portfolio compositions, and the supply due to more emphasis on longer term funding sources. 
That might affect the liquidity in the markets. In addition to the Basel III regulation, this 
paper will present the new bail-in framework that the European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU passed earlier this year (Vale, 2014). The framework is likely to affect the 
attractiveness of covered bonds. 
                                                          
48 Basel I and Basel II 
49 Also called “Third Basel Accord” 
50 Members representing 28 countries from all around the world 
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6.2 Risk-Weighted Assets 
To assure that banks have a strong funding position, the Basel Committee has decided to 
further develop the Basel II regulation’s view on risk-weighted assets (RWAs). The new 
regulation requires that banks hold a minimum of 7%51 of their RWAs in equity capital, an 
increase from 2.5% in Basel II (BNP Paribas Fortis, 2013). The RWAs are calculated by 
multiplying the value of a given asset with its risk weight: 
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 ∗  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 4: Risk-weighted asset (RWA) 
The risk weight is a predetermined percentage depending on the riskiness of the asset, where 
a risky asset has a high percentage and a risk-free asset will have a risk weight of 0%. Finally, 
a bank sums up all the individual RWAs to find the total RWAs. 
Type of asset Risk weight Characteristics 
Covered bonds (EU/EEA) 10% 
 Rating ECAI 1 
 > EUR 500M 
 OC > 2% 
Covered bonds (Outside EU) 10% 
 Rating ECAI 1 
 OC > 7% 
Covered bonds (EU/EEA) 20% 
 Rating ECAI 2 
 > EUR 250M 
 OC > 7% 
Unrated Covered bonds 35% 
 OC > 10% 
 > EUR 250M 
Table 3: Overview of risk weights for different types of European covered bonds (Johansen and Wiberg, 2014) 
All the risk weights presented in Table 3 are low compared to other assets. The lowest weight 
of 10% is for the highest rated (ECAI52 1) and largest (larger than EUR 500M) bonds issued 
by credit institutions within the EU or the European Economic Area (EEA). Covered bonds 
with an outstanding volume larger than EUR 250 million and without ECAI rating have the 
highest risk weight among covered bonds. In order to be included the bonds also need to 
comply with some sort of OC level. Finally, covered bonds smaller than EUR 250M cannot 
be included in the liquidity buffer.  
                                                          
51 This number varies depending on the local or regional regulations. For the Norwegian case this number is 8%, 
where the minimum requirement for Common Equity Tier 1 is 4,5%, Capital Conservation Buffer is 1,5% and 
Systemic Risk Buffer is 2% (Jansrud, 2014). 
52 External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) is just another word for rating agencies. The European 
Banking Authority (EBA) has been given the assignment of mapping objectively all ECAI in order to promote a 
consistent implementation of ratings provided by different ECAIs in CRD IV practice (EBA, 2014). 
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This reinforced requirement of equity capital will force banks either to allocate more of their 
capital towards less risky assets with low risk weights such as cash, government or covered 
bonds, or to increase their equity capital through retained earnings or private offerings. 
Assuming that banks will do a little of both means that the RWA regulation might increase 
banks’ demand for less risky papers such as covered bonds. 
6.3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is a measure of a bank’s liquid assets, and the ability to 
fund operations in a difficult market-funding environment. The measure was introduced in 
the Basel III regulation, and is seen as one of the most important reactions by regulators 
following the recent financial crisis (BNP Paribas Fortis, 2013). During the crisis, several big 
banks had huge liquidity problems due to difficulties of obtaining funding in the market. 
Market participants were resistant to trade other securities than those of very high liquidity 
(BIS, 2009). Thus, low liquidity might have substantial consequences for a financial system. 
According to Basel Committee (2013) LCR is as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
≥ 100% 
Equation 5: Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
The fraction tells us that at a minimum, the high quality liquid assets (HQLAs) have to 
exceed the amount of net outflow estimated53 for a 30-days period in a distressed market 
environment. Under the assumptions that all HQLAs are regarded as safe investments, a bank 
does not need to raise more funds in the market in order to cover the outflow. They can in 
theory always fund the net cash outflow by selling HQLAs and will thus not face liquidity 
problems. 
When estimating a bank’s HQLAs all approved assets are divided into two groups; HQLA 
Level 1 and HQLA Level 2, where HQLA Level 1 has the highest liquidity. These securities 
have the lowest haircut rate when calculating the value of the HQLA stock. In that way, the 
haircut rate helps to adjust the value of a security when determining how much of an asset’s 
market value that can be included in the stock of HQLAs. Since Norway54, Sweden and 
                                                          
53 The net cash outflow is estimated on assumptions about the relationship to the funding source 
54 As part of the EEA  
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Denmark are all under European legislation the relevant haircut rates are decided in the new 
CRD IV regulation (see Table 4 below).  
There are limits to the size of each asset class’ share of the HQLAs, which is also covered by 
CRD IV. As a starting point, the Basel committee recommended that the value of HQLA 
Level 1 securities should not exceed 60% of the total HQLA stock, and that covered bonds 
should not be defined as HQLA Level 155 (Johansen and Wiberg, 2014). In this case 
European regulators did not follow the recommendations from the Basel Committee. On 10 
October 2014, the European Commission (2014) informed that certain covered bonds will be 
included in the HQLA Level 1, and that the applicable cap of the total HQLA stock is 70%. 
Together with covered bonds, other highly liquid assets such as cash, deposits and 
government bonds are defined as HQLA Level 1.  
HQLA Level Cap applicable Haircut applicable 
Covered bonds ECAI 1 1 70% 7% 
Covered bonds ECAI 2 2A 40% 15% 
Unrated high quality covered bonds 2B 15% 30% 
Table 4: Overview of covered bond in CRD IV (European Commission, 2014) 
Covered bonds rated as ECAI 1 are eligible for HQLA Level 1 (Table 4). These bonds have 
the lowest haircut56 rate, and due to an applicable cap of 70%, they will probably make up an 
important part of European banks’ stock of HQLAs. The unrated covered bonds have the 
lowest liquidity of the bonds in the table and hence assigned the highest haircut rate. 
The LCR will be implemented gradually in 2015-2019 (Appendix 1). The European LCR 
legislation has given covered bonds a central position, which might increase the demand for 
covered bonds in Europe. However, it is uncertain when the liquidity effect of the LCR will 
occur. Although the minimum requirement will be only 60% in 2015, banks might position 
themselves for a future change of the requirement and thus adapt their portfolio already from 
2015. 
6.4 Net Stable Funding Ratio 
Together with LCR, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) informs regulators about the 
bank’s ability to cope with distressed market conditions. The objective of implementing such 
                                                          
55 The main underlying assets,  residential mortgages, have not experienced severe price falls during the last 
decades so it is difficult to conclude that covered bonds have high quality when they have not been “tested” 
56 Sovereign debt as government bonds and bills are regarded as the least risky security with a correspondingly 
haircut of 0% 
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regulations is to promote more medium and long-term funding of a bank’s assets and 
activities. The NSFR was also introduced in Basel III to prevent a similar liquidity crisis that 
many banks faced under the financial crisis. According to BIS (2009), many banks were 
capitalized with short-term market funding. When the crisis occurred, the short term debt 
could no longer be rolled over57. That would not occur if banks had HQLA they could sell to 
repay their debt, which shows that the LCR and NSFR complement each other. According to 
the Basel Committee (2009) the NSFR is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
≥ 100% 
Equation 6: Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
The relevant time span is one year. According to KPMG (2012) both the numerator and 
denominator are calculated by applying risk weights depending on the asset type, similarly to 
the calculation of RWAs. The numerator is related to the right hand side of the balance sheet, 
where long-term funding as equity and long-term debt is dedicated a high weight. As for the 
denominator, assets on the left hand side of the balance sheet are included. Risky and/or long-
term assets are dedicated a high risk weight, meaning that a company needs more available 
stable funding.  
This new regulation will probably also influence the portfolio and funding composition of 
banks. Banks will want to increase the maturity of their funding in order to be less exposed to 
refinancing risk. The long-term structure of covered bonds, which reduces a bank’s duration 
gap,58 is one of the reasons for why covered bond markets have grown rapidly in many 
countries recently (ECBC, p.106, 2014). When calculating the NSFR, covered bonds 
contribute considerably to the available amount of stable funding. On the other hand, the 
requirement for stable funding for covered bonds as an asset is low. These two factors will 
likely lead to increased activity in covered bond markets. Again, it is unclear when such an 
effect might occur in the marketplace. According to the phase-in schedule of Basel III 
regulations (Appendix 1), the NSFR will not be fully implemented before 2018, which means 
that banks have several years to fully adapt to this requirement.  
                                                          
57 Rolling over debt refers to the type of short-term market funding such as 7-days repurchase agreements that is 
continuously repeated.  
58 When the assets’ duration is different from the liabilities’ duration. In the case of a bank the assets usually 
have the highest duration and thus a bank reduces the gap by increasing the duration of the liabilities.  
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6.5 Bail In 
In addition to the Basel III accord that is being implemented through the CRD IV, the 
Council of the EU and the European Parliament have agreed upon a recovery plan for banks 
that will be an important mechanism in order to solve potential future banking crises (KPMG, 
2013). According to Vale (2014), the bail in legislation is implemented so that banks that face 
distressed periods are able to continue with their core business without capital injections from 
local governments. In practice, bail in means that a troubled bank can be forced to convert 
some of its liabilities with low priority into equity and write it off if in case of substantial 
loses.  
 
 
Figure 20: Bail in process (ECBC, p.61, 2014) 
Figure 22 gives an example of which assets that are subject to the European bail in 
legislation. The first thing to notice is the clear sequence of the liabilities’ priority and the 
liabilities that are excluded from the bail in framework. In an event of a banking crisis, the 
shareholders’ equity will be written off first. If the losses exceed shareholders’ equity, 
subordinated debt will be converted into equity and written off59. This process will continue 
and might include deposits from natural persons and small, medium and micro sized 
enterprises (Figure 22). The reaming liabilities on the balance sheet are exempt from being 
converted. Thus, if losses are large, banks can still go bankrupt or need to request capital 
injections from the local government. 
                                                          
59 If the bail in legislation is exercised, at least 8 % of the liabilities must initially be written off or converted 
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The new legislation will increase the risk for several debt holders in the bank. Investors in for 
example subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt have traditionally been protected by a 
contract that assures them their interest and principal amount. If the bank fails to repay and 
goes bankrupt, the shareholders will take loses, but debt holders will still get some or all of 
their claims repaid. However, as the bail in framework give authorities the right to force 
specific debt holders to convert their claims into equity, their investor rights are weakened 
and the debt becomes more risky.  
A plausible consequence of this new legislation is that funding sources as subordinated debt 
and other types of debt included in the bail in framework will be more expensive due to the 
increased risk. Banks might therefore end up funding more of their business by issuing other 
types of debt that is higher up in the capital structure, as covered bonds. That might lead to 
increased supply of such securities. As discussed earlier, the effect of increased supply is 
again uncertain, but a bigger outstanding volume will most likely result in increased absolute 
turnover.  
  
Page 52 
 
7. Methodological issues regarding liquidity 
7.1 What is liquidity? 
In this paper we will compare the liquidity in the secondary Scandinavian bond markets from 
2007 until 2014. In order to do this there are several quantitative measures that can be 
applied. However, before discussing how to measure liquidity it is necessary to clarify what 
the term liquidity means. 
Liquidity is an ambiguous term that is hard to define in only one sentence. This is supported 
by Mohanty (2002) who claims that “market liquidity has several dimensions and there is not 
one satisfactory definition that captures all the features of a liquid market”. A couple of 
papers on liquidity were presented in the review of previous literature. This is however only a 
tiny part of what that has been written about market liquidity, which demonstrates how 
extensive the research on this field is. Nevertheless, researches do not clearly agree on how to 
define this term and you can find different definitions in each paper. A definition given by 
Amihud and Medelson (1991) is commonly agreed upon and states that “an asset is liquid if it 
can be bought or sold at the current market price quickly and at low cost”. This means that 
liquidity is related to trades in the market and is high if trades can be easily facilitated. Even 
though this is a fairly brief definition, it does not explain what “quickly” and “low cost” 
mean. A more deliberate definition is provided by Gabrielsen, Marzo and Zagalia (2011) who 
claim that “a market is often said to be liquid when the prevailing structure of transactions 
provides a prompt and secure link between the demand and supply of assets, thus delivering 
low costs of transaction.” Instead of saying “at a low cost”, Garbrielsen et al. (2011) give a 
more describing definition by using microeconomic terms as demand and supply. But again, 
this is not a non-elusive definition of the term, and an even more deliberate definition is 
necessary.  
7.2 Dimensions of liquidity 
Harris (1990) is frequently60 referred to when defining liquidity in the most complete way. 
Harris introduces the following four dimensions of liquidity; width, depth, immediacy and 
resilience, which are similar to the dimensions Kyle (1985) uses to define liquidity; tightness, 
depth and resilience. Although the four dimensions that Harris introduces might seem 
independent, Wuyts (2007) states that they are not and may at times overlap.  
                                                          
60 Some examples are Mohanty (2002), Chen and Zheng (2008) and Rakkestad, Skjeltorp and Ødegard (2012) 
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Figure 21: Arbitrary order book 
For the following presentation of Harris’ (1990) four dimensions of liquidity, it is helpful to 
use a figure (Figure 23) in order to provide a better understanding for the reader. The figure 
gives an example of an arbitrary order book of a traded asset (e.g. bond) where there are 
buyers (bid) and sellers (ask) that quote prices they are willing to trade on. In the middle, 
there is the market price 𝑃∗, which is the price of the last trade registered in the market. The 
height of the columns illustrates the quantity offered at the different quoted prices. 
As we discussed in the part about the Scandinavian markets, most of the bonds we analyze 
are not traded in an auto-matched trading system. Some are not traded in a trading system at 
all due to the markets’ OTC traditions. Still, the aspects related to liquidity apply 
independently of how trades are conducted.  
7.2.1 Width 
The first dimension Harris (1990) mentions is width. In Figure 23, width is the difference 
between the highest bid price 𝑃𝐵
1 and the lowest ask price 𝑃𝐴
1 and is often described as the 
bid-ask spread. The spread can be regarded as the price one has to pay in order to acquire 
liquidity at a given moment. A seller who wants to sell assets in order to obtain more funds 
might initially be unwilling to sell below 𝑃𝐴
1 , which is the price he believes to be fair. If 
something happens that forces the seller to raise funds quickly, he needs to find a buyer for 
his quoted assets. In our model, the seller would prefer the buyer with the highest bid price 
𝑃𝐵
1. This is however a lower price than what the seller believes to be fair. Hence, the cost of 
the urgent liquidity need is the spread 𝑃𝐴
1 − 𝑃𝐵
1. Depending on the size of the spread, it is 
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possible to give an estimate on whether the liquidity in the market is high or low, where a 
tight spread indicates high liquidity.  
As the example above illustrates, good liquidity is defined by a tight spread and thus a low 
transaction cost. This coincides with the definition of Amihud and Mendelson (1991) that 
relates to “low cost”. This is only a part of Harris’ definition of liquidity, which shows that 
their definition is narrower and relatively incomplete. 
What neither Harris’ (1990) definition of width nor Amihud and Mendelson (1991) talk about 
is the quantity an investor can buy or sell at prices 𝑃𝐴
1 and 𝑃𝐵
1. This is a highly relevant issue 
when discussing market liquidity because investors in financial markets may want to trade 
considerable amounts. That might lead to a bigger transaction cost than first perceived by the 
initial bid-ask spread. 
7.2.2 Depth 
Next, Harris (1990) introduces depth, which reflects the volume that can be traded in the 
market without affecting the price (Hein, 2003). This second dimension is of great 
importance for big investors and must be seen in combination with width when analyzing 
liquidity. The main reason for this is that investors that have to sell off assets in order to raise 
funds want to minimize the transaction cost. As mentioned earlier, the transaction cost is the 
spread between 𝑃𝐴
1 and 𝑃𝐵
1, but this applies only for a finite amount.  
In Figure 23, imagine there is a seller that thinks the fair price is 𝑃𝐴
1 and offers an amount 
equal to 𝑉𝐴
1. If a sudden funding need emerges and the seller needs to liquidate assets as 
quickly as possible, the act of impatience comes with a cost which is the spread 𝑃𝐴
1 − 𝑃𝐵
1. 
However, since 𝑉𝐵
1 <  𝑉𝐴
1 the seller needs to accept an even lower price 𝑃𝐵
2, which will 
increase the transaction cost to 𝑃𝐴
1 − 𝑃𝐵
2 for the volume 𝑉𝐴
1 − 𝑉𝐵
1. Since 𝑉𝐴
1 = 𝑉𝐵
2 the seller 
does however not need to accept an even lower price as all extra supply is absorbed in the 
market at 𝑃𝐵
2. This example shows that in some cases the width dimension is an incomplete 
definition of market liquidity. It might not reflect the actual transaction cost.  
7.2.3 Immediacy 
The third dimension is immediacy and according to Wuyts (2007) it “refers to how quickly 
trades of a given size can be done at a given cost”. The market liquidity is not considered 
good if market participants cannot meet in a marketplace and carry out trades. This 
dimension is harder to observe by looking at market and transaction data. It is more a matter 
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of the institutional and technological facilities then just quoted bid and ask prices. Although 
technological obstacles are not common in developed markets today, there are markets where 
the institutional aspects are not in place. Examples of this are markets without market makers 
who quote prices, or markets that do not have an established marketplace to carry out trades 
so that most trades are done OTC. In this case brokers play an important role. 
Gabrielsen et al. (2011) emphasize that a liquid market is related to “a prompt and secure link 
between demand and supply of assets”. Their more unraveled definition supports Harris 
(1990) in his third dimension. If the link between buyers and sellers is not secure, more 
contractual work needs to be done before the trade can be executed. This dimension is vital 
for market participants that for example are in a liquidity squeeze, and need to raise funds 
quickly61. 
7.2.4 Resiliency 
The last dimension is according to Rakkestad et al. (2012) “notoriously difficult to measure, 
but captures a very important aspect of secondary market liquidity”. Resiliency is about how 
fast prices will return to normal following an uninformed and unbalanced order flow (Harris, 
1990). The word “unbalanced” is in this context related to the depth of the quoted market 
prices. The reason why prices move in the first place is an increased demand that exceeds the 
depth of market supply. That leads to the same outcome as in the example discussed earlier, 
where the market price moves from 𝑃∗ to 𝑃𝐵
2 (see Figure 23). The market is resilient if market 
makers quickly react by increasing the supply of assets and thus reducing the difference 
between the market price before and after an unbalanced order flow. Rakkestad et al. (2012) 
also refer to a paper by Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2012) where the researches show that 
resiliency can be given as a function of three input factors, where one relates to how intensely 
market makers monitor the market. The rationale behind this is that the more they monitor the 
market, the faster they can provide liquidity and thus prices will be less variable. 
So, from the discussion of these four dimensions, a liquid market is characterized by a small 
width, large depth, good immediacy and strong resiliency. It is important to look at these 
measures collectively, as they are interrelated (Wuyts, 2007). For example, it is not to any 
help for a seller that the width is small and the depth is large if immediacy is poor. On the 
                                                          
61 Nordic Trustee (before Norsk Tillitsmann) plays a vital role in the contractual part in the Nordic markets. See 
www.nordictrustee.com for more information.  
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other hand, an investor can face small depths for bid prices but if the resilience of the market 
is good then large amounts can still be sold at a low transaction cost. 
7.3 How to measure liquidity? 
Harris (1990) argues that liquidity is defined along four dimensions and this paper will take 
this approach as well. Next, we discuss how to measure some of the different liquidity 
dimensions in order to compare bond types and bonds markets. In addition to the complexity 
of defining liquidity, researchers also have difficulties in finding a set of measures that 
capture all aspects of liquidity. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter and Lando (2009) write that “there is 
no consensus on how to measure the liquidity of an asset, so we examine a number of 
liquidity-related measures (…)”. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) support this statement and 
say that “liquidity (…) is not observed directly but rather has a number of aspects that cannot 
be captured in a single measure”. Since most of the literature states that one should comprise 
several measures when analyzing liquidity, this paper will follow the same practice.  
In the paper by Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) several analysis are carried out with a 
wide range of old and new liquidity measures, in order to identify the most appropriate ones. 
That paper shows that there exists a vast amount of different liquidity measures than can be 
applied in our analysis. However, the conclusion of the paper is that some measures are better 
than others. Consequently, it is better to stick to a set of few good measures than several 
imprecise ones.  
In order to combine the different dimensions of liquidity provided by Harris (1990) with 
sound and applicable liquidity measures, we will look to Buchholst, Gyntelberg and Sangill 
(2010) when choosing measures. The measures they employ are as follows:  
 Median trade size  
 Turnover rate 
 Bid-ask spread  
 Trade price impact measure (Amihud)  
Although these measures are all relevant for our analysis, we need to adjust some of them 
according to the available data on the Scandinavian bond markets. Due to lack of daily 
transaction data for some markets,62 we use average trade size instead of median trade size, 
                                                          
62 Se chapter about Data for more discussion about the data set  
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and we simplify the price impact measure. More discussion on these minor changes follows 
below.  
The subsequent part will go into the four proxies and measures of liquidity. The two liquidity 
proxies (average trade size and turnover rate) are quite straightforward and will not need 
much explanation. However, two liquidity measures (Roll’s bid-ask spread measure and the 
simplified price change measure) will include an element of theoretical discussion. From this 
point, we will refer to these four measures and proxies as measures only.  
7.4 Liquidity measures 
7.4.1 Average trade size 
The average trade size is a measure that will give a brief illustration of the activity in the 
markets, in terms of the size of the trades. A large average trade size means that it is possible 
to buy and sell big quantities in the market. This measure is related to Harris’ (1990) depth 
dimension. 
7.4.2 Turnover rate 
The turnover rate has strong theoretical appeal and data for this rate is easy to obtain (Datar, 
Naik and Radcliffe, 1998). The rate discloses how many times the outstanding amount of 
assets is traded in a given period. The formula is 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
 
Equation 7: Turnover rate 
This rate can be calculated per day, month or year. It can also be calculated for each security 
or aggregated for the whole market. The intuition is that a high rate indicates high liquidity 
while a low rate indicates low liquidity. For example, a market with a low turnover rate might 
have many investors holding on to their securities due to reasons such as a bank’s required 
amount of liquid assets. This means that a buyer needs to increase his price substantially in 
order to find a seller, which would lead to an increased transaction cost as explained related 
to Harris (1990) width dimension. On the other hand, a low turnover rate might indicate that 
there are few buyers quoting prices due to various reasons. Again, the transaction cost would 
be high because the seller would have to decrease the price substantially in order to find a 
buyer. Both of these examples illustrate how turnover rate is related to liquidity and 
transaction costs through the width element. 
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In addition to the information the rate provides, Dick-Nielsen et al. (2009) defines the 
inversed rate as the average holding time for an asset. This means that if the inversed 
turnover rate based on monthly (quarterly) data is 10, the average holding period is 10 
months (quarters). 
As mentioned, the rate can be calculated both per bond and for the market as a whole. In 
order to get a measure of the turnover rate for an average bond in the market we should 
calculate the turnover rate per bond and then take the unweighted average. This requires a 
very comprehensive data set since we need to know the volume of each trade in addition to 
the bond’s outstanding volume at all times. As we will discuss in the data chapter, our 
transaction data is not detailed enough to calculate this per bond for all markets. We will 
therefore calculate the aggregated turnover rate instead. It is not clear which method that is 
most correct, but since we in this paper compare several markets, we are confident that the 
aggregated turnover rate serves our purpose. 
7.4.3 Bid-ask spread  
So far, we have not discussed measures directly related to the dimensions provided by Harris 
(1990). The Bid-ask spread is the spread between the highest bid price and the lowest ask 
price, respectively 𝑃𝐵
1 and 𝑃𝐴
1 in Figure 23. This spread is frequently used to measure width. 
According to Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) the bid-ask spread is the most utilized liquidity 
measure among researchers. Rakkestad et al. (2012) introduces a similar measure that is 
called the relative bid-ask spread. The formula of this measure is: 
𝑅𝑆𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝐴 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐵
𝑃𝑡
𝑀  
Equation 8: Relative bid-ask spread 
 𝑃𝑡
𝐴 and 𝑃𝑡
𝐵 are the best ask and bid prices quoted during the period, and 𝑃𝑡
𝑀 =  (𝑃𝑡
𝐴 + 𝑃𝑡
𝐵)/
2. 𝑅𝑆𝑡 is easy to calculate for securities where bid and ask prices are quoted regularly, but in 
markets such as the Norwegian covered bond market, such prices are not officially quoted. In 
such cases, measures like Roll’s (1984) bid-ask spread measure or Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinka’s (1999) LOT measure can be applied. Since the LOT measure requires a long and 
broad index for the underlying security, we will employ the Roll measure (Rakkestad et al., 
2012). However, based on empirical research the Roll bid-ask spread measure is not 
necessarily the optimal choice. Both Lesmond (2005) and Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka 
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(1999) prove that the LOT measure dominates the Roll measure. But again, we do not have a 
long and broad index for the underlying assets so we will choose the Roll measure. 
Roll (1984) suggests that under the assumption that markets are informationally efficient63, it 
is possible to estimate the bid-ask spread by using this formula: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 2√−𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1) 
Equation 9: Roll’s bid-ask spread measure 
Cov is the first-order serial covariance64 and 𝑃𝑡 is the transaction price at time t, where t can 
for example be a week, a month or a quarter. The denomination of the spread depends on 
whether the input price changes are in absolute terms or in percentage. In our case, the price 
change and spread will be in absolute terms. For calculating the measure Buchholst et al. 
(2010) use data from a rolling window of 21 trading days where there are several trades every 
day. We have data sets with fewer observations than this paper, thus we will use a longer 
rolling window of 32 trading days. In order to make sure that the covariance is reliable, we 
find it necessary to increase the amount of trading days to get sufficient amount of input data. 
Roll (1984) claims that the price of a security moves continuously and randomly within a 
price interval where 𝑃𝑡
𝐵 < 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡
𝐴 (see Figure 24). For his research he assumed that each 
security will trade at the bid and ask price 50 % of the time respectively (Holden, 2009). 
 
Figure 22: Roll's assumption about price movement of a security 
In Figure 24 the price moves back and forth within an interval with ask prices at the top and 
bid prices at the bottom. This movement indicates a negative covariance between prices for 
different times t. If one calculates the covariance of several price changes occurring between 
t1 and t2, and t2 and t3 the 𝑐𝑜𝑣 < 0, and this condition has to be satisfied in order for the Roll 
                                                          
63 A market price of a security reflects all public information 
64 Measure of how much two random variables move together. In order to calculate the covariance you need 
several observations for each variable because it impossible to calculate the covariance between to constants.  
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measure to be valid. Spreads are reported as positive numbers, and since the spread will be 
negative when 𝑐𝑜𝑣 > 0, the result is not valid and cannot be used in the later analysis. 
 
Figure 23: Price movement with increasing upward trend 
An example of a price movement that results in a negative spread is shown in Figure 25. In 
this case, 𝑐𝑜𝑣 > 0 for all times t and the results will not provide information about the 
estimated spread.  
As a final remark on the Roll measure, there are some complications related to its use. Since 
there is an assumption that prices move up and down within an interval determined by bid 
and ask prices, it is important to have frequent data on trades. Consequently, if trades are not 
frequent the measure might be imprecise. Furthermore, for some securities there might be 
price paths that are not random walks but on the contrary with strong downward- or upward-
sloping trends. Such characteristics will add noise to the results and make them incorrect or 
invalid. Finally, the covariance might be a source of error because a too small sample will 
make the covariance imprecise. This is also related to the issue of not having enough data 
because a larger sample size for the covariance calculations leads to fewer Roll measure 
calculations. This enforces the problem related to bonds where there is already a problem 
with few trades. 
The bid-ask spread is one of the most important liquidity measures, and indicates the width 
dimension of the market liquidity. Usually, the required inputs are historical quotes of bid and 
ask prices for a period of time. However, in markets were such quotes are not available, a 
measure like Roll’s (1984) bid-ask spread measure must be used.  
7.4.4 Price impact  
The fourth and last measure is a price impact measure that is related to the depth dimension 
in Harris (1990). The main academic measure for depth is the Amihud (2002) Illiquidity 
Measure. This is supported by Chen and Zheng (2008) claiming that “a widely used proxy for 
measure of liquidity in recent empirical studies is an illiquidity measure employed by 
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Amihud (2002)”. Several papers like Mancini, Ranaldo and Wrampelmeyer (2013), 
Bushman, Le and Vasvari (2010) and Buchholst et al. (2010) apply the Amihud illiquidity 
measure. According to the latter paper, the formula is as follows: 
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖 =
|
𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖−1
𝑃𝑖−1
|
𝑄𝑖
 
Equation 10: Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure 
𝑃𝑖 is the trading price and 𝑄𝑖 is the trading volume, where a big relative price change 
indicates low liquidity. In that case, the depth of the current bid or ask price is small and the 
trade has a big impact on the price and again a significant transaction cost. However, if the 
trade is of a large size, a larger price impact is expected because the trading volume is high. 
To adjust for this, Amihud proposes to divide by 𝑄𝑖. The intuition behind this is that a market 
does not need to be illiquid every time the price moves because an investor that carries out a 
big trade will automatically move the price. Consequently, in this case an investor must 
expect a higher transaction cost.   
In the subsequent years after Amihud (2002) published his measure, numerous researchers 
have come up with their own versions65. One recently published version was presented by 
Dick-Nielsen, Gyntelberg and Sangill (2012), who have come up with the following formula: 
𝑃𝐼𝑡,𝑖,𝑘 =
|𝑃𝑡,𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑃𝑡,𝑖−1,𝑘|
𝑃𝑡,𝑖−1,𝑘
 
Equation 11: Dick-Nielsen et al.’s relative price change measure 
The i signifies the transaction number on day t in bond k. The only difference from the 
original Amihud (2002) formula is that Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) do not divide the relative 
price change by the trade volume (𝑄𝑖 in 𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖). They argue for this based on empirical 
observations in their paper that prove there is no significant relationship between price impact 
and trading volume for the Danish bond market66.  
Preferably, we should apply both price change measures in our paper on covered bond 
markets for two reasons. Firstly, two measures will probably give a better indication of which 
market that is more liquid than one measure. Secondly, we could test if Dick-Nielsen et al.’s 
                                                          
65 Rakkestad et al. (2012), Chen and Zheng (2008) and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2009) 
66 If there is any relationship at all, the relationship is negative 
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(2012) claim that relative price changes are independent of trade size also goes for the 
Norwegian market. However, as we already have emphasized, our data sets do not include 
sufficient information on trading volume, which makes it impossible to calculate the Amihud 
Illiquidity Measure. This paper will thus use Dick-Nielsen et al.’s (2012) relative price 
change measure.  
Now we have presented the four measures we will use in our analysis: 
 Average trade size 
 Aggregated turnover rate 
 Bid-ask spread measure (Roll (1984)) 
 Relative price change measure (Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012)) 
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8. Data 
8.1 Selection of data 
We base our analysis on data from Scandinavian marketplaces on trades and issues of bonds 
from 2007 until October 2014. We focus solely on the domestic market in each country, and 
therefore only include bonds listed on domestic marketplaces in the domestic currency. Most 
covered and government bonds in the different Scandinavian countries are listed on various 
exchanges, and the data has been assembled from a wide range of databases. We have 
excluded bonds not listed in order to better compare the markets and due to difficulties in 
gathering data on these bonds. We have also eliminated all identified outliers in order to 
avoid noisy results. The main focus of the paper is to compare the liquidity of traded bonds in 
three different countries and thus at least three different markets places are included.  
In order to carry out the analysis, we need data on (1) outstanding volumes of the bonds in 
the market, (2) historical trading prices and (3) trading volumes per bond. The relevant period 
is 1 January 2007 to 30 September 2014. Even though the three data types might seem 
simple, the work of obtaining all the data has been more time-consuming than expected. 
Somewhat special bond markets that lack proper transparency is the main reason for this. 
This goes in particular for information about trades made in the secondary market. Altstedter 
(2014) supports the claim that bond markets are less transparent than other markets, such as 
stock markets. 
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Type of security  Type of data Source  Included in 
sample 
Norwegian government 
bonds 
Outstanding volumes Oslo Børs All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices Infront67 All listed bonds per 
30.9.2014 
Trading volume Oslo Børs All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Norwegian covered 
bonds 
Outstanding volumes Stamdata All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices DNB All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Volumes DNB All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Swedish government 
bonds 
Outstanding volumes SCB68 All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices Nasdaq OMX Sweden All bonds listed per 
30.9.2014 
Trading volumes Riksbanken All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Swedish covered bonds 
Outstanding volumes Stamdata All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices Nasdaq OMX Sweden All listed fixed rate 
benchmark bonds per 
30.9.2014 
Trading volumes Riksbanken All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Danish government 
bonds 
Outstanding volumes Nasdaq OMX Denmark  All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
and Danish FSA 
All bonds listed per 
30.9.2014 
Trading volumes Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
and Danish FSA 
All listed bonds in the 
relevant period 
Danish covered bonds 
Outstanding volumes Nasdaq OMX Denmark All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Prices Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
and Danish FSA 
75 largest bonds listed 
per 30.9.2014 
Trading volumes Nasdaq OMX Denmark 
and Danish FSA 
All bonds listed in the 
relevant period 
Currencies 
SEK/EUR, NOK/EUR 
and DKK/EUR 
Macrobond database  
Table 5: Sources for data on Scandinavian covered bonds and government bonds 
Table 5 provides an overview of the different marketplaces and institutions that have been 
involved when gathering data for the later analysis. In addition to the data provided by the 
marketplaces in each country, we have used published data from public institutions such as 
central banks and statistical bureaus. Furthermore, Nordic Trustee’s database “Stamdata” has 
been particularly useful in our work. This database provides reference data for Nordic debt 
securities and the depth and accuracy available is superior for data on the Scandinavian fixed 
                                                          
67 Data provider – www.goinfront.com 
68 Finansmarknads- and verdepapperstatistiken from Svenska Statistiska Centralbyrån (SCB) 
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income markets69. Stamdata has been especially helpful for collecting information about 
individual bonds and outstanding volumes in the Norwegian and Swedish market70. Stamdata 
has also been helpful as an introduction to what specifications a standard bond contract 
includes, which is relevant information when dealing with bonds. As presented above, both 
the Swedish and the Danish bond markets are organized by Nasdaq OMX, but they are still 
set up as two different marketplaces. 
In the next three parts we will go into more detail about each of the countries in terms of 
where to find relevant data and eventual complications we encountered on the way. 
8.2 Data - Norway 
As shown in Table 5, we have used several sources in order to obtain sufficient data for the 
Norwegian market. For Norwegian covered bonds, DNB71 provided us with a complete data 
set with trades executed in all bonds at Oslo Børs in the relevant period. This gave us a quick 
introduction to the covered bond market in Norway. Additionally, we received a set of trades 
for Norwegian covered bonds from 2010 from Nordea. We used these two sets and 
information from Stamdata and Oslo Børs to put together a list of trades in all the covered 
bonds we wanted to include in our set. Noticing that the set of bonds from the two banks did 
not match, we spent a considerable amount of time investigating which bonds that did in fact 
meet our definition of the market. We ended up with a total of 311 bonds, where 299 of these 
were backed by residential mortgages72. For trades, Oslo Børs publish a monthly report on 
the secondary market activity for bonds in Norway. However, the statistics they offer for free 
only go back five years, so Infront’s database73 was necessary in order to complete the set on 
trading data for government bonds. We obtained outstanding amounts for all government and 
covered bond on a monthly basis by downloading data on initial issues, tap issues and 
buybacks from the Stamdata database.  
To investigate different parts of the Norwegian covered bond market, we split the set of 
bonds into smaller groups according to certain characteristics. Wanting to differentiate on the 
size of bonds, we made one group consisting of bonds with an outstanding volume less than 
                                                          
69 Bloomberg and Reuters also provide data 
70 Stamdata has relatively few Danish bonds in its database  
71 Norway biggest financial services group 
72 The remaining 12 bonds were backed by commercial mortgages 
73 This database is based on Oslo Børs database 
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NOK 1 billion. Further, we separated bonds included in the Covered Bond Benchmark and 
lastly bonds issued by the three largest issuers in the market74. 
One important aspect of our data is that it is uncertain whether tap issues are included in the 
trading data on covered bonds or not. As they are not part of the secondary market activity, 
they should be excluded when calculating liquidity measures. According to market 
participants, tap issues often appear as normal trades in the data sets. However, according to 
our research, that is not always the case. Even though we have identified tap issues by 
comparing data from Stamdata and DNB, we have also encountered situations where we are 
certain that tap issues do not appear as normal trades. Due to this uncertainty, and the fact 
that we have not been able to get a good explanation on the procedure in such cases, we have 
chosen not to adjust the data. To get an indication on the possible effect of this, we have 
compared the amount of tap issues to the total amount of trades for each single year from 
2008 (Table 6). 
Year Tap issues Total turnover Tap issues / Total turnover 
2008 5 500 000 000 7 929 500 00 69 % 
2009 10 200 000 000 14 371 330 000 71 % 
2010 18 200 000 000 41 975 500 000 43 % 
2011 70 415 000 000 138 992 000 000 51 % 
2012 43 475 000 000 159 319 900 000 27 % 
2013 44 696 666 666 234 734 800 000 19 % 
2014* 72 454 000 000 233 900 000 000 31 % 
Total 264 940 666 666 831 223 030 000 32 % 
  * Until October 
Table 6: Overview of tap issues and turnover for the Norwegian covered bond market 
In Table 6 we have included data on tap issues from Stamdata and turnover figures from the 
DNB data set. As can be seen, the ratio of tap issues to total turnover was about 70% in 2008 
and 2009, but has fallen to 20%-30% in the last three years. These percentages represent the 
worst case scenario for how much our turnover figures are affected.  
8.3 Data - Sweden 
The Swedish market is less transparent than the Norwegian covered bond market, which for 
example can be seen from the amount of data sources that have been used in the process. This 
transparency issue resulted in us using an incomplete data set. More specifically, we do not 
have data on all bonds listed in the relevant period, and for the bonds where we do, the data 
are only on a daily basis. In the process of gathering data, we first approached different 
                                                          
74 DNB, Nordea and Sparebank1 (SB1) 
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institutions, but it turned out that no one had a complete data set for the entire market. As we 
did for the Norwegian market, we also approached Swedish commercial banks, but they only 
had data sets on trades where they acted as a buyer or seller. We also contacted Riksbanken75 
which only could provide monthly aggregated trading data. We ended up using historical 
daily yield data provided by Nasdaq OMX Sweden on currently listed benchmark bonds. Per 
October 2014, both fixed and floating rate bonds are listed on the exchange, but due to the 
complicated process of valuing floating rate bonds76, our Swedish set of price data consists 
only of historical prices on fixed rate bonds77. The valuations had however not been possible 
without the information about maturity dates and coupon rates provided by Stamdata. In 
order to calculate prices, we made a simple valuation model with input from among others 
Stamdata. For government bonds we faced exactly the same complications as for covered 
bonds, and our data set for these securities is also based on prices of fixed rate bonds78 
calculated from daily yield data. 
Another shortage in the Swedish data is that we lack data on trading volume on transactional 
level. For the average trade size measure, this would however not have been a problem if we 
possessed the number of transactions per day. Yet again, the Swedish market turned out to be 
opaque and we have not obtained this information. Swedish FSA was the only actor that 
could supply us with transaction level data. It was very cryptic so we ended up not using it. 
Lastly, we needed monthly outstanding volumes for the two types of bonds. As previously 
mentioned, Stamdata has an extensive database on the Norwegian and Swedish covered bond 
market, so that part turned out to be less challenging. For the government bonds, we found 
the data by accessing SCB’s website and combining two different statistical reports.  
8.4 Data - Denmark 
As stated earlier, the Danish covered bond market is the biggest market in terms of most 
measures, has the longest history and is the most sophisticated in terms of legislation. 
However, it has been challenging to get our hands on a complete and correct set of data for 
the Danish markets. A lot of information is available at Nasdaq OMX’s webpages, but due to 
the vast amount of bonds in the market, it was too time-consuming to extract the data 
                                                          
75 http://www.riksbank.se/en/Statistics/Money-and-Bond-Markets/  
76 See bonds pricing chapter 
77 Fixed rate bonds dominate the market so this is regarded as a good proxy for the whole market. For better 
explanation see Figure 12 about the Swedish issuers. 
78 All government bonds are fixed rate bonds 
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manually. We therefore contacted different institutions hoping to get help putting a complete 
data set together, among others the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks, the 
Danish Mortgage Banks’ Federation, The Danish National Bank, several Danish commercial 
banks, The Danish FSA and Nasdaq OMX Denmark. After getting in contact with the right 
people at the two latter institutions, we were able to put together large sets of data. 
We received a vast data set with all trades conducted in all covered bonds from Nasdaq 
OMX. The data period was from 2007 until October 2014, and included prices and volumes 
of trades. The only information about the bonds except this was the ISIN number, which 
limited our possibilities of reviewing the bonds and look at selections of bonds according to 
any characteristics. We later received a set with aggregated data on average prices, trading 
volumes and outstanding volumes for all bonds on a monthly basis. These were more 
manageable, and were used to calculate the number of trades and liquidity measures like 
monthly average trade size per bond and turnover rate. In addition to the data received from 
Nasdaq OMX, we received daily data from the Danish FSA, which also included data on 
Danish government bonds. 
Unfortunately, due to two reasons, we decided not to use the daily data on prices and volumes 
from the sets mentioned earlier. Firstly, these data were so large that we had difficulties with 
calculating liquidity measures without our computers struggling. Secondly, we discovered 
unusually large differences in prices, both within the same day, and between subsequent 
trading days. After consulting the Danish FSA on this, we decided to discard the data.  
We ended up downloading daily data on a selection of bonds from the Nasdaq OMX website. 
For government bonds, we downloaded daily prices and trading volumes on all bonds that 
were listed at the time of extraction. In order to get sufficient data to do sensible calculations 
on covered bonds, we made a selection based on the following requirements: 
1. Outstanding value of more than DKK 5 billion by October 2014 
2. Issued before 2012  
3. Trade at the time of extraction 
Being able to do calculations on all bonds in the markets would be ideal. However, with the 
difficulties we have encountered, and due to the large size of the market, we believe we are 
able to make sound conclusions with the restrictions we have made.   
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A general observation for the markets in all Scandinavian countries is that outstanding 
volumes are easier to obtain than transaction data such as price and volume per trade. Most of 
the trading volumes we have are on aggregated levels, not on transactional levels. We have 
approached the local FSAs in Denmark and Sweden, trying to get information in order to 
adjust for the lack of transactional data. This was as stated helpful for Danish bonds, but the 
Swedish data set was too cryptic to use.  
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9. Results 
9.1 Structure of results 
These results are based on the data discussed in the preceding chapter. As stated previously, 
the data sample of bonds for the Danish and Swedish market is not complete. For the analysis 
this means that for average trade size and turnover rate, we will use data gathered for the 
whole market. However, when we estimate the other liquidity measures, the input is only 
based on parts of the markets. The structure of the presentation will be in the same order as 
for the measures discussed in the methodology chapter. As for each measure, we will first 
present the development of the Norwegian covered bond market. Then we will do a 
comparison with the other two Scandinavian covered bond markets, followed by a 
comparison with government bond markets in the same countries. Finally, we will break the 
Norwegian market down into several groups in an attempt to explain its development in more 
detail.  
Using data denominated in the local currency would affect the comparison of the average 
trade size and Roll’s bid-ask spread measure. When comparing markets in different countries, 
we have converted all numbers into EUR. 
To show an example of gathered raw data, we have included two tables in the appendix 
(Appendix 3 and 4). The former presents output data on liquidity measures in the Norwegian 
covered bond market, while the latter displays raw data for calculating the measures in one 
Norwegian covered bond. 
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9.2 Average trade size 
9.2.1 Norwegian covered bond market 
The first result is of the average trade size for the entire Norwegian covered bond market 
(Norwegian COVB). 
Figure 24: Average trade size (monthly average) – Norwegian covered bond market 
Since 2010, the average trade size in Norwegian covered bonds has been quite stable with a 
minor down-sloping trend towards 2014 (Figure 26). Towards the end of the period, the level 
has stabilized around an average trade size of NOK 50.000.000. Before 2010, the average 
trade size was much more volatile.  
Figure 25: Average trade size and number of trades – Norwegian covered bond market  
By including the development in number of trades, we can easier explain the development of 
average trade size for Norwegian covered bonds. Looking at Figure 27, the average trade size 
is represented by the blue columns with the level showing on the left axis, while the number 
of trades per month is in orange and the level corresponds to the right axis. As can be seen 
from the graph, the main reason for the spike in 2009 is because of some few and abnormally 
large trades. In the beginning of the period, the number of trades was very low, meaning that 
a single trade might have a relatively larger impact on the average size than in months with 
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many trades. In addition to this, the peak occurs in a period where the world is experiencing a 
financial crisis and unusually few trades are executed. Risk premiums on bonds were higher 
and investors were probably more skeptical of trading with each other. We will not go in to 
detail about this spike every time, so for all later graphs in which the spike appears we refer 
to this discussion. 
9.2.2 Norwegian covered bond market vs other covered bond markets 
  
Figure 26: Average trade size (monthly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
To further analyze the average trade size in the Norwegian covered bond market, we have 
chosen to compare it to some other covered bond markets. In Figure 28, we have included the 
average trade size for the Danish market79. Compared to this, the liquidity in the Norwegian 
market is high in terms of average trade size. This observation did not occur just a couple of 
times but is consistent throughout the whole period. The Danish averages are also backed by 
a great amount of observations, so the explanation for this must be that Danish market 
participants usually carry out smaller trades than in the Norwegian market.  
9.2.3 Norwegian covered bond market vs government bond markets 
  
Figure 27: Average trade size (monthly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
 
                                                          
79 As discussed in the Data chapter we do not have data on number of trades for Swedish covered bonds 
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 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average, EUR 
Norwegian COVB 5 759 574 8 692 315 7 557 246 7 330 194 7 077 940 
Norwegian Gov 8 555 952 7 292 253 7 997 409 9 029 979 7 596 374 
Swedish Gov - - - - - 
Danish Gov 8 245 417 7 534 495 9 343 954 7 326 773 9 095 877 
*Until October 
Table 7: Average trade size (yearly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
As discussed in the chapter on government bonds, each country has its own government bond 
issuing facility and all Scandinavian countries have outstanding bonds. The first we can see 
from Figure 29 is that during the last couple of years, the liquidity in terms of average trade 
size has been more or less as good in the Norwegian covered bond market as in the 
Scandinavian government bonds markets80. Furthermore, there were some peaks for average 
trade size in Norwegian covered bonds around the start of 2009 and one in mid-2011. The 
peak in 2009 is earlier explained by few and large transactions, while for the peak in 2011 
there are more trades but the trades are larger than normal. Based on this we do not find it 
correct to conclude that the Norwegian covered bond market is more liquid. To support this 
statement, Table 7 shows that the Norwegian yearly average trade size was the lowest in all 
three years from 2012-2014. The numbers in bold represent the highest yearly trade size, and 
hence the highest liquidity.  
9.2.4 Different groups of bonds in the Norwegian covered bond market 
Figure 28: Average trade size (monthly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
As stated earlier, after having seen how the Norwegian covered bond market has performed 
in comparison to other bond markets, we split the market into different smaller groups. This 
is to investigate which types of Norwegian covered bonds that have had the highest and 
lowest liquidity. Norwegian COVB includes the entire covered bond market. Norwegian 
COVB; Benchmark only includes bonds in the newly established Norwegian Covered Bond 
                                                          
80 We do not have data on number of trades for Swedish government bonds  
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Benchmark81. Norwegian COVB; <1 billion consist of the smallest bonds, with less than 
NOK 1 billion outstanding. Norwegian COVB; DNB, Nordea and SB1 is a sample that 
includes bonds issued by the three biggest issuers in terms of outstanding volume.  
The first observation we make from Figure 30 is that the data from 2007-2010 consists of few 
observations. Secondly, there are important spikes in beginning of 2009 and mid-2011. In 
general, a case where you have a sample that comprises the whole market (Norwegian 
COVB), compared to smaller samples that all sum up to the market, some samples will have 
a higher average and some lower than the entire market. For the peaks around the start of 
2009 however, none of the samples have a higher average than the market. This means that 
we have not included the bonds that are causing the spike in any of our smaller groups, and 
thus we cannot analyze the spike further. The same cannot be said about the spike in 2011. In 
this case, the main contributors for the increased market average trade size are bonds in 
benchmark group.   
The third and last observation we can make from Figure 30 is that trades in bonds with less 
than NOK 1 billion are smaller on average. In practice, this indicates that it is harder to sell 
large amounts of this type of bond. Similarly, the bigger bonds in the benchmark and the 
bonds issued by the largest issuers have a higher average trade size which points to a higher 
liquidity.  
According to the average trade size measure, we do not find any evidence that the Norwegian 
market is more or less liquid than other bond markets. However, we have reason to believe 
that larger bonds in the Norwegian market are more liquid than smaller bonds. 
  
                                                          
81 The benchmark was not established before June 2014. However, the bonds included in the benchmark today 
did exist before its introduction. 
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9.3 Turnover rate 
In order to further evaluate the liquidity of the Norwegian covered bond market and other 
Scandinavian bond markets, we will next look at turnover rate. 
9.3.1 Norwegian covered bond market 
Figure 29: Turnover rate (monthly average) – Norwegian covered bond market 
With the exception of a few months in 2009 that we have discussed earlier, the turnover rate 
for the Norwegian covered bond market was low during the financial crisis 2008-2010 
(Figure 31). Since 2011, the turnover rate has increased and on average the rate is at a higher 
level than before. This indicates that the liquidity of the market has improved. On the other 
hand, the rate has been relatively volatile in the last couple of years, which makes it hard to 
conclude on whether the market has stabilized on a high level or not. 
9.3.2 Norwegian covered bond market vs other covered bond markets 
Figure 30: Turnover rate (monthly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average 
(of monthly rates) 
Norwegian COVB 0,026 0,050 0,042 0,052 0,063 
Swedish COVB 0,238 0,167 0,182 0,182 0,118 
Danish COVB 0,193 0,182 0,231 0,186 0,161 
* Until October 
Table 8: Turnover rate (yearly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
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By looking at the Norwegian market separately, we identified an improvement over the last 
years. However, when comparing it to the Swedish and Danish covered bond market the 
turnover rate is notably lower than its counterparts’ rates (Figure 32). The Swedish market 
had a very high turnover rate in the years of 2007-2009, but which later decreased towards 
the level of the other markets. The turnover rate for the Danish covered bond market has been 
volatile but on average somewhere in between the Norwegian and Swedish markets’ rates. 
There are clear seasonal effects with spikes at the end of each year. Later, the volatility in the 
Danish market has decreased but the average level has more or less stayed the same. In total, 
this development has led to a convergence of turnover rates and by 2014 the Danish and 
Swedish rates are very similar. In fact, according to Table 8 the Danish market’s yearly 
average surpassed the turnover rate of Swedish covered bonds in 2011, and has stayed at a 
higher level since then. The Norwegian market’s low turnover rate indicates a lower liquidity 
and it has been dominated by the two other markets for most of the time.  
9.3.3 Norwegian covered bond market vs government bond markets 
Figure 31: Turnover rate (monthly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds  
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average  
(of monthly rates) 
Norwegian COVB 0,026 0,050 0,042 0,052 0,063 
Norwegian Gov 0,113 0,110 0,080 0,087 0,078 
Swedish Gov 0,465 0,454 0,500 0,500 0,353 
Danish Gov 0,125 0,099 0,111 0,076 0,088 
*Until October 
Table 9: Turnover rate (yearly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
Compared to the Scandinavian government bond markets, the Norwegian covered bond 
market is again not performing that well (Figure 33). The Swedish government bond market 
performs much better than the other markets in terms of turnover rate. Furthermore, the 
Norwegian and Danish government bond market experienced a higher rate than the 
Norwegian covered bond market early in the period. Recently however, the turnover in 
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Norwegian covered bonds has increased to similar levels as the Norwegian and Danish 
government bond markets (can also be seen from Table 9). 
9.3.4 Different groups of bonds in the Norwegian covered bond market 
Figure 32: Turnover rate (monthly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
 Period 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Yearly average 
(of monthly rates) 
Norwegian COVB 0,050 0,042 0,052 0,063 
Benchmark 0,069 0,047 0,054 0,083 
<1 billion 0,048 0,042 0,060 0,056 
DNB, Nordea and SP1 0,055 0,039 0,044 0,070 
* Until October 
Table 10: Turnover rate (yearly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
Again, we try to break down the Norwegian market in an attempt to identify parts of the 
market that differ from the market as a whole. As for the first years the market existed, 
available data is poor and it is difficult to draw any conclusions. In recent years all groups 
seem strongly correlated which makes it hard to identify differences (Figure 34). However, 
since 2011 the largest bonds in the market, represented by the Norwegian Covered Bond 
Benchmark have the highest peaks. This indicates that if any, the larger the bonds, the higher 
the turnover rate. This statement is also supported by the results presented in Table 10 where 
benchmark bonds had the highest turnover rate in three of the last four years. 
When evaluating the turnover rate, the Norwegian covered bond market is lagging a bit 
behind the other Scandinavian covered bond markets. The Norwegian market also performs 
worse than its peers when comparing it to the three Scandinavian government bond markets. 
Consequently, Norwegian covered bonds seem less liquid than other bonds when looking at 
this measure. 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Tu
rn
o
ve
r 
ra
te
Norwegian COVB Norwegian COVB; Benchmark
Norwegian COVB; <1 billion Norwegian COVB; DNB, Nordea and SB1
Page 78 
 
9.4 Roll’s bid-ask spread measure 
9.4.1 Norwegian covered bond market 
 
Figure 33: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (monthly average) – Norwegian covered bond market 
The first thing the reader might notice from Figure 35 is the lack of data in the start-up phase 
of the Norwegian market from 2007-2010. In order to come up with an estimate of the 
measure, at least 32 consecutive trades are required. We do not have that many trades before 
2010. As we have seen in Figure 27 there were very few trades in the first two-three years 
that the market existed, and thus the measure is not applicable. For the time period where we 
have data, we can see that the spread is quite stable except for the period around the 
beginning of 2011 (Figure 35). As for the rest of the period, the spread has an average 
between NOK 0.2 and 0.3.  
9.4.2 Norwegian covered bond market vs other covered bond markets 
Figure 34: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (monthly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
Both the Swedish and the Danish markets have longer history and we are thus able to 
estimate bid-ask spreads from 2007 (Figure 36). During the crisis years of 2008-2010 the 
reactions in the Swedish and the Danish markets were similar and the spread increased a lot. 
For the Danish market, the spread came down quickly, but the Swedish spread stayed volatile 
for a couple of years more. However, since 2011 all spreads have come down to more or less 
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the same levels. As for the development of 2014, the Norwegian spread is lower than for the 
two other markets, which indicates that the liquidity of the Norwegian covered bonds is 
relatively high. 
9.4.3 Norwegian covered bond market vs government bond markets 
Figure 35: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (monthly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government 
bonds 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average, EUR 
Norwegian COVB 0,041 0,037 0,033 0,035 0,029 
Norwegian Gov 0,030 0,041 0,063 0,039 0,031 
Swedish Gov 0,043 0,037 0,034 0,047 0,031 
Danish Gov 0,052 0,067 0,069 0,049 0,033 
* Until October 
Table 11: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (yearly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
The main trend in Figure 37 is that in the beginning of the period the data varies a lot, but 
towards October 2014, all numbers converge. As the only market in our data set, we were 
able to obtain real bid-ask spreads for the Norwegian government bond market. This is 
presented by the grey line labeled Norwegian Gov (Real spread) in the figure. The real spread 
is relatively stable around EUR 0.03 but with a spike in end of 2008 and a period of wider 
spreads in late 2011 and 2012. As for the other markets, spreads in Danish government bonds 
are the most volatile, which is supported by Table 11. The Swedish market performs well 
most of the time but also has some unstable periods. The Norwegian covered bond market 
obviously has a shorter data history than the government bond markets, but for the period that 
we have calculated measures, the market performs well. This is especially clear if we look at 
the numbers in Table 11.  
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9.4.4 Different groups of bonds in the Norwegian covered bond market 
 
Figure 36: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (monthly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Yearly average, EUR 
Norwegian COVB 0,325 0,287 0,25 0,277 0,231 
Benchmark 0,735 0,436 0,328 0,300 0,187 
<1 billion - 0,219 0,228 0,224 0,215 
DNB, Nordea and SP1 0,735 0,372 0,255 0,321 0,222 
* Until October 
Table 12: Roll's bid-ask spread measure (yearly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
For the average trade size and turnover rate, we have seen that there is a higher liquidity in 
larger bonds. Interestingly, for the bid-ask spread measure, we see the opposite (Figure 38). 
Even though the correlation appears very strong, the increase in the spread at the start of 
2011, start of 2012 and mid-2013 are largest for the bigger bonds. An increased spread 
indicates a higher cost of trading which again indicates worse secondary market liquidity. 
However, the differences are small and we are not able to make any firm conclusions on the 
observations made from just looking at the graph. By looking at the results from Table 12 it is 
clear that smaller bonds have performed best most of the period. 
As for the other measures, we conclude that there is no reason to believe that Norwegian 
covered bonds are less liquid than the other Scandinavian bonds when looking at the bid-ask 
spread. The results from employing Roll’s bid-ask spread measure stating that smaller bonds 
are more liquid than larger bond conflicts with our previous results. 
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9.5 Relative price change  
The final liquidity measure is the relative price change measure.  
9.5.1 Norwegian covered bond market 
 
Figure 37: Relative price change (monthly average) – Norwegian covered bond market 
The level of relative price changes for the Norwegian covered bond market was relatively 
high and volatile during the period 2008-2009 (Figure 39). However, from the beginning of 
2010, the level has decreased considerably and stabilized around 0.0015 for the rest of the 
period. From the extracted graph in the upper right corner of the figure it is also clear that 
there has been a weak downward trend, which indicates increased liquidity. The volatile 
period before 2010 might again be due to few covered bonds in the market so that some 
extreme observations count a lot. Another explanation might be that before 2010 the financial 
crisis spread fear in the market as mentioned earlier, which lead to increased risk premiums.  
9.5.2 Norwegian covered bond market vs other covered bond markets 
Figure 38: Relative price change (monthly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average 
Norwegian COVB 0,0022 0,0022 0,0020 0,0014 0,0012 
Swedish COVB 0,0029 0,0023 0,0016 0,0014 0,0008 
Danish COVB 0,0023 0,0026 0,0020 0,0019 0,0014 
* Until October 
Table 13: Relative price change (yearly average) – Scandinavian covered bond markets 
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When comparing the Norwegian market to the other Scandinavian markets we can state that 
the developments are similar (Figure 40). Even though the biggest spike in relative price 
change for Norwegian covered bonds is larger and comes one year later than the Swedish, all 
three measures come down to more or less the same levels after 2010. The reason for the 
higher volatility before 2010 it is most likely the same for the Danish and Swedish market as 
it was for the Norwegian. The financial crisis scared investors, risk premiums started to 
increase and prices became volatile.  
By looking at the graph, it is hard to separate the different markets after 2010, which is why 
Table 13 is especially useful in this case. Looking at the numbers in the table we can see that 
the Swedish market has the lowest measure in most years, which indicates the highest 
liquidity. Compared to the Swedish, that the Norwegian yearly average is 50% higher, while 
the Danish is 75% higher in 2014 (Table 13). It is hard to say how much this says about the 
liquidity, because measures in for all markets are low compared to period before 2010. Even 
though there were larger absolute differences in the turbulent period of 2009, the relative 
differences are almost as large per October 2014 as they were then. Anyhow, there are no 
strong arguments for stating that the Norwegian market liquidity differs from the other 
markets based on this measure. 
9.5.3 Norwegian covered bond market vs government bond markets 
Figure 39: Relative price change (monthly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Yearly average 
Norwegian COVB 0,0022 0,0022 0,0020 0,0014 0,0012 
Norwegian Gov 0,0028 0,0032 0,0028 0,0023 0,0050 
Swedish Gov 0,0029 0,0023 0,0016 0,0014 0,0008 
Danish Gov 0,0036 0,0045 0,0038 0,0026 0,0016 
* Until October 
Table 14: Relative price change (yearly average) – Norwegian covered and Scandinavian government bonds 
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Although the only sample that is included in both Figure 40 and Figure 41 is Norwegian 
COVB, the figures are quite similar - turbulent times before 2010 followed by a strong 
convergence and low and stable measures. Among the government bond markets, Danish 
bonds have shown lower liquidity in most of the years from 2010 to 2013, while in late 2013 
and 2014 the Norwegian government bonds have emerged as the least liquid market. We do 
not have any specific explanation for why the Norwegian government bond market 
experienced higher relative price changes in 2014 than earlier. Again, the Swedish market 
comes out strong (Table 14) with a relatively liquid government bond market. Norwegian 
covered bonds also perform well and there is no reason to state that the liquidity is low based 
on these relative price change measures. 
9.5.4 Different groups of bonds in the Norwegian covered bond market 
Figure 40: Relative price change (monthly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
 Period 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Yearly average 
Norwegian COVB 0,0022 0,0022 0,0020 0,0014 0,0012 
Benchmark 0,0028 0,0021 0,0016 0,0009 0,0008 
<1 billion 0,0017 0,0028 0,0023 0,0013 0,0015 
DNB, Nordea and SP1 0,0035 0,0023 0,0017 0,0015 0,0012 
* Until October 
Table 15: Relative price change (yearly average) – Groups of Norwegian covered bonds 
After discussing the liquidity measure relative price change our conclusion is that the 
Norwegian covered bond market performs slightly well. In order to understand which parts of 
the market that has contributed to the results we split the market into groups shown in Figure 
42. What is clear from looking at the figure is that smaller bonds were less liquid during the 
turbulent year of 2009, supported by the highest peaks. As 2010 started, most bonds were on 
the same low levels and there have only been some minor spikes up until October 2014. 
Furthermore, what we can read out of Table 15, which is hard to spot in Figure 42, is that 
benchmark bonds have the lowest measure every year for the last four years. 
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9.6 Summary of results 
Type Performance Score 
Average trade size   Covered bonds Average/strong 0,5 
Average trade size   Government bonds Average 0 
Turnover rate          Covered bonds Weak -1 
Turnover rate          Government bonds Weak/average -0,5 
Roll                           Covered bonds Average 0 
Roll                           Government bonds Average/strong 0,5 
Rel price change      Covered bonds Average 0 
Rel price change      Government bonds Average/strong 0,5 
SUM Average 0 
Table 16: Summary of results 
 In Table 16 we will present the main results on liquidity in the Norwegian covered bond 
market compared to other bonds markets. In total, there are eight comparisons by which we 
have judged the market – four liquidity measures where we compare the market to the two 
other Scandinavian covered bond markets and the Scandinavian government bond markets 
respectively. Based on our subjective assessment of the performance, we assign a score 
between -1 and 1, where -1 represents weak and 1 represents strong performance. Finally, we 
have added up all the individual scores to a total score for the entire market. 
As the last row in Table 16 indicates, our subjective conclusion is that the liquidity in the 
secondary market of Norwegian covered bonds is average compared to the other 
Scandinavian bond markets. On some measures, it performs better and on some worse, but 
overall, the total assessment does not indicate that the liquidity is neither higher nor lower.  
Type of measure <1 billion or Benchmark? 
Average trade size Benchmark 
Turnover rate Benchmark 
Roll measure < 1 billion 
Rel price change Benchmark 
SUM Benchmark 
Table 17: Summary of results for Norwegian market 
In Table 17 we briefly sum up the liquidity level of large and small bonds, characterized by 
benchmark bonds and bonds smaller than NOK 1 billion respectively. As the table shows, 
benchmark bonds are more liquid measured on three out of four measures. Hence, benchmark 
bonds contribute the most to the liquidity level in the Norwegian covered bond market. 
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9.7 Other results 
Before we move on to the chapters about criticism and conclusion, we will discuss some 
results that are difficult to see directly from graphs in this chapter, but that may have affected 
the liquidity development. 
9.7.1 Regulation 
As discussed earlier the new European regulations (CRD IV) based on the Basel III accord 
have not yet been fully implemented. However, they are gradually phased in and most banks 
will position themselves for the stricter regulation by changing their portfolios and capital 
structure. Furthermore, covered bonds are highly recognized both as a liquid asset and as a 
stable and long-term funding source. Everything else alike, this should increase the demand 
for covered bonds. As securities become more attractive, the turnover rate might not increase 
significantly because investors do not want to sell. On the contrary, the rate might fall since 
the outstanding volume in the market will rise due to the increased supply of bonds, while 
turnover stays unchanged. We also have reason to expect improvement in the bid-ask spread 
measure. Since investors demand more covered bonds due to the regulatory recognition, more 
bid and ask prices will be quoted. Consequently, that should lead to a tighter spreads and 
larger depths.  
Again, we do not have hard evidence on whether new regulation has improved the liquidity 
or not. The most relevant figure is the Roll bid-ask spread measure for all Scandinavian 
covered bond markets (Figure 36). The trend for all the markets is downward sloping, 
meaning that liquidity is improving. This might be an outcome of the banks’ increased 
demand for covered bonds because of CRD IV, but it may also be an outcome of the markets 
returning to normal conditions after the financial crisis.   
9.7.2 Government Swap Agreement 
As for regulations’ possible influence on liquidity, it can also be difficult to see how the swap 
agreement has affected the market from our results. As we have stated earlier, the market has 
grown a lot, but during the first years after 2007 the main issuance growth was absorbed by 
the swap agreement, and the bonds were therefore taken out of the market (Figure 11, part a). 
In general, the absolute turnover should increase when the outstanding volume increases, but 
since the government held onto these bonds, that did not happen. Consequently, we would 
expect a drop in turnover rate, and if we look at Figure 31 that is what we can observe. 
Except for the earlier discussed peak around the start of 2009, the turnover rate was low 
through 2008 and 2009, followed by an increase over the next years. Overall, this fits well 
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with the development of the swap agreement where the government and mortgage institutions 
reversed the swaps gradually with the last reversal in mid-2014. 
9.7.3 Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark 
The last of the three aspects we believe has influenced liquidity is the introduction of the 
Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark in June 2014. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this 
benchmark is to increase the availability and thus the liquidity in the largest covered bonds 
listed on Oslo Børs.  
Y/Y change 
2013/2014 
Avg. trade 
size 
Turnover 
rate 
Roll bid-ask 
spread 
Rel. price 
change 
June  +54 % +112 % -54 % +11 % 
July +140 % +337 % +6 % -40 % 
August +20 % +91 % +58% -44 % 
September +13 % +95 % +32 % -20 % 
Conclusion Improved Improved Worsened Improved 
Table 18: Development in liquidity measures for bonds included in the Norwegian Covered Bond Benchmark 
Benchmark bonds are one of the sample groups used in the liquidity analysis, and is made up 
of all bonds comprised in the benchmark by 30 September 2014. In Table 18, we present the 
results of a year-on-year comparison for each of the four measures, in an attempt to identify 
the eventual effects the benchmark has had on the liquidity (For more info, see Appendix 2). 
The main results are that the average trade size has gone up, the turnover rate has increased, 
the bid-ask spreads have increased and the relative price changes have gone down. Changes 
in three of the four measures imply that the introduction of the benchmark has led to 
improved liquidity. Again, there might be other reasons for why these changes are in favor of 
increased liquidity, such as the recovery after the financial crisis and effects from new 
regulations. 
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10. Criticism  
By looking at the results presented in Table 16 in of the previous chapter, we conclude that 
the liquidity of the Norwegian secondary covered bond market is average. In this chapter, we 
will discuss what might have brought noise to our results, and affected our conclusions. We 
will start by discussing whether it is preferable to compare liquidity in different domestic 
markets, before we go more into detail by elaborating on the weaknesses of the data set and 
on the liquidity measures and their assumptions. 
According to Hein (2003), it is not preferable to compare different domestic government 
bond markets. He argues that the importance of the different dimensions of liquidity depends 
partly on the market structure, number of market participants, market size and market 
behavior. Finally, he says that comparing markets across borders is a difficult task since a 
liquidity measure might give different indications on the level of liquidity. Consequently, we 
must keep in mind that the three markets are different, and that it might affect our results. For 
example in 2013, the total turnover in the Danish covered bond market was DKK 6000 
billion while the Norwegian barely surpassed NOK 200 billion. The structure is also very 
different where the Danish system is a pass-through system, but the Norwegian and Swedish 
are not. In order to way up for these differences, we have included several measures hoping 
that the total assessment will make adjust for some of the concerns Hein (2003) presents. 
When going in to more particularities, the data sets that we have used should be addressed. 
As mentioned in the Data chapter, we did not manage to get complete data sets for all bonds 
in all markets. We have not been able to assess Swedish floating rate covered bonds, the 
entire Danish covered bond market or specific characteristics on Danish and Swedish covered 
bonds. However, we feel that most data sets are large enough in terms of bonds included to 
be used as a proxy for the whole market. Furthermore, price data turned out to be the trickiest 
data to gather which made us go for a simpler version of the price impact measure and to use 
average trade size instead of median trade size. This has obviously also affected the quality of 
the Roll’s bid-ask spread measure and the relative price change which use price data as input. 
Without frequent data, the assumption behind the bid-ask spread measure stating that the 
price continuously fluctuates within an interval will become challenged. For the relative price 
change measure, price changes that occur over a longer period with few observations might 
not be because of low liquidity but rather due to new information. Concerning the price data 
we have, some of them are only closing day data, which means that we do not have more than 
one observation per trading day. In periods where we have few days with trades, there can be 
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as much as several weeks between trades. This might create noise because liquidity measures 
assume frequent observations meaning that the only reason for a large price change is low 
liquidity in the market. When there are a couple of weeks between two trades, the price 
change does not necessarily mean that the liquidity is low and sellers have to accept a lower 
price, but rather that there has come new information to the market, which will affect the 
pricing of bonds. Such information can for example be a change in the central bank’s deposit 
rate or a change in the market risk premiums.  
Another reason for why a change in price is not necessarily due to low liquidity is that bonds 
follow a natural price path towards their par value. This problem is most relevant for fixed 
coupon bonds. With floating coupon bonds however, the coupon rate is regularly adjusted to 
the market rate, so the market price is relatively close to par at all times. In order to adjust for 
the natural price path of fixed rate bonds, we could have used a formula introduced by 
Downing, Underwood and Yuhang (2005). However, this process is very time-consuming 
and the drift rate is believed to be fairly small, so we expect the change in results to be small 
and have therefore not adjusted our data. 
As a final remark, there might be errors in our data set that we have not been able to remove. 
Such errors will alter our analysis, but due to the large data sets used, single incorrect 
numbers are not expected to affect our conclusions in a large degree.    
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11. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have investigated the liquidity in the Norwegian secondary covered bond 
market. We have compared this to the secondary covered and government bond markets in 
the other Scandinavian countries, Sweden and Denmark. Further, we have looked at groups 
of Norwegian covered bonds according to certain characteristics, to analyze this market more 
thoroughly. We have also focused on recent developments such as new regulation through 
Basel III, the reversal of the Government Swap Agreement and the implementation of the 
Covered Bond Benchmark, to study any changes in liquidity related to these. 
Our research has been conducted by gathering data on outstanding volumes of bonds in the 
market, historical trading prices and trading volumes per bond from 2007 until October 2014. 
We have implemented several liquidity measures to our data that complement each other, in 
order to get a comprehensive picture of the development in liquidity. By comparing different 
markets in several time periods, we have obtained a good base for drawing conclusions on 
any liquidity developments. 
Over the last years, the liquidity in the Norwegian covered bond market has improved 
considerably along with the growth of the market. From an unstable period with few bonds in 
the market in 2007 and 2008, all measures point at higher liquidity from 2010/2011 in more 
stable market conditions. The main result from our research is that the liquidity in the 
Norwegian secondary covered bond market is neither higher nor lower than the liquidity in 
the other Scandinavian bond markets. There are however important differences between some 
markets. While the average trade size in the Norwegian covered bond market is in the same 
range as the Scandinavian government bond markets, it is notably higher than in the Danish 
covered bond market. The turnover rate in the Norwegian covered bond market is relatively 
lower than in all the comparable markets. The large and highly developed Danish covered 
bond market and the Swedish government bond market stand out with significantly higher 
turnover rates. According to the liquidity measure Roll’s bid-ask spread however, the 
liquidity in the Norwegian market is on par with the other covered bond markets, and higher 
than the Scandinavian government bond markets. Looking at the relative price change 
measure, the results from all markets are quite similar, and we are not able to draw 
conclusions about higher or lower liquidity. The measures we have employed give us 
contradictory results at times, but in total, we conclude that the liquidity in the Norwegian 
covered bond market is on average compared to other Scandinavian markets. 
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Looking at different groups of bonds within the Norwegian covered bond market, we 
conclude that the bonds included in the Covered Bond Benchmark have the highest liquidity. 
On all measures except Roll’s bid-ask spread measure, the results were unambiguous. We 
also studied the change in liquidity for the bonds included in this benchmark, to consider the 
possible effect of its introduction in June 2014. Also here we found evidence for improved 
liquidity on all measures except Roll’s bid-ask spread measure. There are however 
uncertainties whether the improved liquidity in bonds included in the benchmark is due to the 
implementation of this, better market conditions in general, or other aspects we are not able 
to identify. Finally, we have not been able to prove what part new regulations and the reversal 
of the Swap Agreement has played in the liquidity development. 
Our research has proven that the secondary covered bond market in Norway can be 
characterized as relatively mature and well-functioning. In 2014, the market is quite active, 
and includes a repo market which is important to keep the market efficient. Liquidity is 
important for reducing the risk premium demanded by investors and for a market to work 
properly. These aspects are important for the recognition of the market as stable, liquid and 
efficient in relation to regulation, for example those introduced by Basel III, when it comes to 
the riskiness and liquidity of assets. It is also important to gain attention from foreign 
investors, who might demand proof of stability and liquidity before considering investing in a 
foreign and relatively young market. Ultimately, these developments are important for 
ensuring low funding costs for the issuing banks, which should also result in lower rates on 
house owners’ mortgages. 
This paper addresses the secondary covered bond market in Norway, and even if we briefly 
discuss the primary market, that is an area which might be interesting for future research. As 
the market grows and quickly changes, there might be many interesting aspects in relation to 
that. Further, we have not included a thorough discussion or any analysis on the repo markets 
related to the Scandinavian covered bond markets. In Norway, that is a quite new feature, and 
both an empirical analysis and an analysis on how that affects liquidity seem interesting. 
Investigating the liquidity in the Norwegian covered bond market at a later stage is also a 
possibility. Our research on the effect on liquidity in relation to the reversal of the 
Government Swap Agreement and the implementation of the Covered Bond Benchmark is 
affected by a short period of time to analyze. By investigating that at a later stage, it should 
be possible to draw more sound conclusions of the direct effect of these measures on the 
liquidity in the market. 
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13. Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1: Basel III phase-in arrangements 
 
 
Appendix 2: Overview of calculations on introduction-of-benchmark effects 
 
 
Change YoY Change YoY Change YoY Change YoY
June 2013 50 494 681 0,0361 0,5565 0,0008695
July 31 361 702 0,0110 0,3099 0,0014406
Aug 60 156 627 0,0366 0,1585 0,0008672
Sept 55 950 704 0,0291 0,1442 0,0007016
June 2014 77 862 745 54 % 0,0765 112 % 0,2579 -54 % 0,0009636 11 %
July 75 168 317 140 % 0,0483 337 % 0,3296 6 % 0,0008704 -40 %
Aug 72 361 290 20 % 0,0699 91 % 0,2501 58 % 0,0004830 -44 %
Sept 63 046 980 13 % 0,0568 95 % 0,1906 32 % 0,0005578 -20 %
Rel PCRollTurnover rateAverage trade size
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Appendix 3: Example of output data on liquidity measures – Norwegian and Danish covered bonds 
Period Average (NOK) Observations Average (DKK) Observations Period Average Observations Average Observations Period Average Observations Average Observations Period Average (NOK) Observations Average (DKK) Observations
2007 58 894 737      19 6 719 809      820 113      2007 5.48% 19 21.17% 820 113      2007 0.000870 15 0.001587 3 640           2007 0.292879 3 640           
1 4 756 962      76 095         1 18.28% 76 095         1 0.001341 272              1 272              
2 5 310 424      57 548         2 15.30% 57 548         2 0.001406 264              2 0.122865 264              
3 5 047 393      66 532         3 16.61% 66 532         3 0.001143 308              3 0.184356 308              
4 3 592 544      61 965         4 10.99% 61 965         4 0.001441 257              4 0.230853 257              
5 4 122 151      62 276         5 12.54% 62 276         5 0.001419 287              5 0.464168 287              
6 4 641 842      89 343         6 19.94% 89 343         6 0.002237 296              6 0.409510 296              
7 4 008 299      76 880         7 14.21% 76 880         7 0.001884 333              7 0.081302 333              
8 110 000 000    2 4 144 095      64 246         8 7.33% 2 12.19% 64 246         8 0.001711 359              8 0.216976 359              
9 105 250 000    2 4 321 636      61 756         9 7.02% 2 12.20% 61 756         9 0.001203 2 0.001561 324              9 0.221630 324              
10 15 300 000      5 4 140 323      69 211         10 2.13% 5 13.02% 69 211         10 0.000283 4 0.001586 380              10 0.060758 380              
11 51 750 000      4 10 850 980   68 650         11 3.70% 4 33.72% 68 650         11 0.001709 4 0.001563 323              11 0.168160 323              
12 67 500 000      6 26 533 308   65 611         12 7.23% 6 74.99% 65 611         12 0.000535 5 0.001667 237              12 0.256373 237              
2008 62 932 540      126              6 142 397      830 976      2008 2.52% 126              19.27% 830 976      2008 0.005577 92 0.003821 3 126           2008 0.501232 3 126           
1 52 500 000      2 9 213 435      80 617         1 1.59% 2 37.21% 80 617         1 0.000586 2 0.002205 340              1 0.481120 340              
2 39 000 000      2 8 817 906      59 591         2 1.18% 2 23.23% 59 591         2 0.000230 1 0.001707 299              2 0.422316 299              
3 22 375 000      8 4 448 565      53 708         3 2.46% 8 10.48% 53 708         3 0.003686 4 0.002149 252              3 0.576801 252              
4 26 000 000      2 4 020 118      68 110         4 0.71% 2 11.97% 68 110         4 0.000892 2 0.002029 263              4 0.666198 263              
5 32 750 000      4 4 064 783      59 521         5 0.75% 4 10.51% 59 521         5 0.005483 2 0.002895 270              5 0.558027 270              
6 53 571 429      7 4 241 838      75 755         6 1.98% 7 14.14% 75 755         6 0.010972 6 0.003391 294              6 0.538198 294              
7 15 642 857      7 3 318 812      76 101         7 0.58% 7 11.10% 76 101         7 0.001057 5 0.003444 289              7 0.487997 289              
8 6 500 000        4 3 970 847      53 581         8 0.14% 4 9.32% 53 581         8 0.009691 3 0.002943 240              8 0.280720 240              
9 6 666 667        3 4 141 531      68 568         9 0.11% 3 12.36% 68 568         9 0.006664 3 0.003881 237              9 0.376751 237              
10 39 808 824      34 3 950 048      104 713      10 5.31% 34 18.84% 104 713      10 0.003151 29 0.008601 269              10 0.454052 269              
11 64 803 571      28 5 103 687      82 082         11 5.67% 28 18.02% 82 082         11 0.002120 20 0.007993 171              11 0.550530 171              
12 147 440 000    25 24 226 238   48 629         12 9.75% 25 54.10% 48 629         12 0.015349 15 0.007571 202              12 0.498464 202              
2009 74 079 021      194              6 628 689      834 221      2009 1.79% 194              19.00% 834 221      2009 0.004360 148 0.002965 4 381           2009 0.529550 4 381           
1 148 911 765    17 4 683 837      68 992         1 6.44% 17 14.76% 68 992         1 0.005731 14 0.004409 227              1 0.291697 227              
2 49 453 488      43 4 746 059      48 945         2 4.03% 43 10.61% 48 945         2 0.004459 22 0.004110 197              2 0.256043 197              
3 45 840 000      25 4 716 199      65 466         3 1.53% 25 13.94% 65 466         3 0.004728 19 0.003743 346              3 0.595668 346              
4 238 785 714    14 5 118 726      57 892         4 4.32% 14 13.37% 57 892         4 0.001005 13 0.003333 366              4 0.601022 366              
5 67 375 000      8 5 947 191      54 132         5 0.68% 8 14.39% 54 132         5 0.000765 6 0.002755 358              5 0.717655 358              
6 46 000 000      10 5 374 368      63 058         6 0.47% 10 14.91% 63 058         6 0.001796 7 0.003136 388              6 0.565905 388              
7 51 272 727      11 4 172 700      70 676         7 0.58% 11 13.12% 70 676         7 0.007460 10 0.002556 429              7 0.492095 429              
8 11 000 000      4 4 892 326      77 541         8 0.05% 4 16.63% 77 541         8 0.024058 4 0.002324 357              8 0.510594 357              
9 62 813 529      17 5 835 644      77 709         9 1.02% 17 19.38% 77 709         9 0.006767 15 0.002677 376              9 0.451144 376              
10 72 133 333      15 3 536 709      110 294      10 1.01% 15 15.91% 110 294      10 0.001980 13 0.002860 419              10 0.577235 419              
11 61 294 118      17 9 657 084      76 896         11 0.97% 17 29.35% 76 896         11 0.001813 14 0.002439 443              11 0.543866 443              
12 32 730 769      13 23 125 263   62 620         12 0.39% 13 51.65% 62 620         12 0.002131 11 0.002633 475              12 0.466551 475              
2010 44 512 725      943              8 265 430      690 425      2010 2.57% 943              19.27% 690 425      2010 0.002205 711 0.002258 7 547           2010 0.324817 77 0.385765 7 547           
1 62 157 143      35 4 246 120      77 401         1 2.03% 35 14.62% 77 401         1 0.003091 23 0.002526 509              1 0.105960 1 0.536543 509              
2 47 310 345      29 5 880 382      45 030         2 1.26% 29 11.69% 45 030         2 0.002544 22 0.002267 463              2 0.450065 463              
3 62 394 737      38 9 097 546      50 623         3 2.17% 38 19.73% 50 623         3 0.001814 29 0.001817 580              3 0.300652 580              
4 46 342 466      73 5 071 652      45 119         4 2.87% 73 10.16% 45 119         4 0.001451 53 0.001979 509              4 0.228781 8 0.247186 509              
5 33 671 429      35 7 226 393      44 015         5 0.98% 35 13.98% 44 015         5 0.002730 24 0.002563 529              5 0.345195 1 0.399391 529              
6 41 043 750      80 6 384 176      65 492         6 2.64% 80 17.88% 65 492         6 0.002420 57 0.002338 668              6 0.345478 6 0.474490 668              
7 37 009 615      52 3 886 475      61 189         7 1.54% 52 10.34% 61 189         7 0.001737 40 0.002003 666              7 0.396816 666              
8 51 425 439      114 5 914 743      59 344         8 4.26% 114 15.08% 59 344         8 0.002677 76 0.002249 685              8 0.290065 9 0.299563 685              
9 41 266 129      124 9 264 228      66 304         9 3.41% 124 25.33% 66 304         9 0.002046 102 0.002162 729              9 0.078961 7 0.282553 729              
10 63 320 000      100 4 762 620      74 891         10 4.16% 100 15.22% 74 891         10 0.001458 80 0.002152 729              10 0.090775 4 0.375912 729              
11 33 692 308      130 11 574 184   52 194         11 2.83% 130 23.85% 52 194         11 0.001592 99 0.002235 752              11 0.091687 14 0.382289 752              
12 34 556 391      133 31 240 978   48 823         12 2.71% 133 53.36% 48 823         12 0.003320 106 0.002787 728              12 0.586912 27 0.412861 728              
2011 67 537 415      2 058           9 654 316      555 362      2011 5.05% 2 058           18.19% 555 362      2011 0.002204 1762 0.002560 9 812           2011 0.287069 526 0.511525 9 812           
1 57 453 488      86 6 023 711      58 344         1 2.82% 86 15.36% 58 344         1 0.001978 70 0.002288 756              1 0.517599 20 0.571024 756              
2 58 802 239      134 5 389 947      41 812         2 4.18% 134 9.81% 41 812         2 0.002190 110 0.002073 681              2 0.777240 33 0.556503 681              
3 77 230 570      193 13 953 805   47 367         3 7.42% 193 27.15% 47 367         3 0.002538 163 0.002449 788              3 0.630364 37 0.467876 788              
4 119 170 139    144 5 103 930      41 970         4 8.35% 144 9.33% 41 970         4 0.002242 118 0.002463 630              4 0.126195 17 0.392219 630              
5 55 162 162      259 6 096 336      40 242         5 6.55% 259 10.65% 40 242         5 0.001654 224 0.002521 727              5 0.148443 71 0.353331 727              
6 44 078 947      190 7 233 625      35 151         6 3.60% 190 10.93% 35 151         6 0.001097 173 0.002138 662              6 0.169147 55 0.391607 662              
7 36 892 593      135 4 830 809      38 389         7 2.11% 135 8.04% 38 389         7 0.001503 111 0.002556 735              7 0.175277 28 0.567632 735              
8 80 698 675      151 7 408 164      48 010         8 5.05% 151 15.33% 48 010         8 0.002918 142 0.002942 832              8 0.217806 39 0.566177 832              
9 61 848 062      258 13 133 909   50 131         9 6.33% 258 27.16% 50 131         9 0.002748 223 0.003037 961              9 0.237688 71 0.552586 961              
10 86 397 653      213 5 085 081      53 680         10 6.95% 213 11.62% 53 680         10 0.002637 183 0.002524 902              10 0.190412 55 0.496473 902              
11 65 426 573      143 14 975 709   51 027         11 3.44% 143 30.51% 51 027         11 0.002480 113 0.002777 1 060           11 0.326260 45 0.533345 1 060           
12 69 486 842      152 23 830 787   49 239         12 3.77% 152 42.40% 49 239         12 0.002341 132 0.002580 1 078           12 0.259158 55 0.649577 1 078           
2012 56 516 460      2 819           9 976 897      716 064      2012 4.18% 2 819           23.12% 716 064      2012 0.002031 2512 0.002023 14 466         2012 0.250039 1114 0.510958 14 466         
1 60 697 642      212 5 311 020      90 193         1 4.44% 212 20.11% 90 193         1 0.002328 187 0.002293 1 255           1 0.267275 84 0.554894 1 255           
2 62 827 236      246 9 507 074      50 161         2 5.19% 246 19.56% 50 161         2 0.002049 222 0.002074 1 181           2 0.312635 95 0.505741 1 181           
3 59 030 364      247 15 112 176   52 400         3 4.74% 247 30.24% 52 400         3 0.002002 222 0.002158 1 283           3 0.224259 102 0.432035 1 283           
4 56 821 229      179 5 557 131      55 852         4 3.30% 179 12.93% 55 852         4 0.001835 158 0.002007 1 066           4 0.243623 69 0.279733 1 066           
5 57 522 099      181 7 980 900      48 241         5 3.35% 181 15.81% 48 241         5 0.001923 161 0.002199 1 094           5 0.234668 59 0.480455 1 094           
6 59 115 789      190 9 165 898      81 053         6 3.58% 190 29.76% 81 053         6 0.002208 173 0.002328 1 239           6 0.208767 80 0.391933 1 239           
7 48 996 032      126 5 687 045      72 388         7 1.96% 126 16.80% 72 388         7 0.002523 114 0.001973 1 282           7 0.202192 58 0.470858 1 282           
8 60 932 432      222 14 189 679   44 602         8 4.23% 222 24.86% 44 602         8 0.002282 206 0.001801 1 258           8 0.272353 93 0.861967 1 258           
9 52 755 102      343 10 390 206   53 624         9 5.51% 343 20.95% 53 624         9 0.002152 295 0.002111 1 167           9 0.250716 137 0.607419 1 167           
10 57 136 637      333 5 190 775      75 694         10 5.72% 333 15.51% 75 694         10 0.002098 290 0.001790 1 314           10 0.230404 125 0.569593 1 314           
11 53 136 861      274 24 614 514   49 526         11 4.28% 274 44.87% 49 526         11 0.001245 245 0.001671 1 302           11 0.252547 120 0.443585 1 302           
12 49 699 248      266 17 583 629   42 330         12 3.85% 266 25.98% 42 330         12 0.002010 239 0.001905 1 025           12 0.278816 92 0.416927 1 025           
2013 58 522 762      4 011           11 458 560   500 337      2013 5.18% 4 011           18.61% 500 337      2013 0.001351 3522 0.001858 14 870         2013 0.276696 1491 0.366919 14 870         
1 66 524 419      430 7 037 481      63 607         1 8.16% 430 18.93% 63 607         1 0.001692 392 0.002009 1 371           1 0.211221 161 0.582772 1 371           
2 65 635 600      250 12 644 026   36 478         2 4.58% 250 18.55% 36 478         2 0.001145 217 0.001970 1 156           2 0.274119 85 0.490373 1 156           
3 56 561 475      244 19 926 082   34 563         3 3.77% 244 25.65% 34 563         3 0.001451 214 0.001778 1 120           3 0.221458 81 0.385136 1 120           
4 67 315 594      404 7 973 317      46 396         4 7.29% 404 15.24% 46 396         4 0.001761 334 0.001615 1 227           4 0.271795 142 0.410606 1 227           
5 70 792 600      473 8 008 942      41 799         5 8.73% 473 13.60% 41 799         5 0.001494 408 0.001702 1 198           5 0.436818 154 0.289170 1 198           
6 51 931 250      320 6 941 345      40 217         6 4.38% 320 11.19% 40 217         6 0.001277 285 0.002374 1 176           6 0.426234 119 0.356104 1 176           
7 34 953 704      162 4 389 494      48 133         7 1.48% 162 8.60% 48 133         7 0.001281 142 0.001740 1 385           7 0.372693 60 0.416188 1 385           
8 52 796 358      302 20 477 091   34 434         8 4.12% 302 27.09% 34 434         8 0.001190 264 0.001976 1 269           8 0.185053 113 0.403674 1 269           
9 52 398 305      354 10 103 072   38 384         9 4.78% 354 14.55% 38 384         9 0.001410 311 0.001980 1 274           9 0.245494 136 0.340830 1 274           
10 48 689 706      340 7 714 424      51 732         10 4.22% 340 16.20% 51 732         10 0.000894 298 0.001797 1 375           10 0.223238 127 0.313559 1 375           
11 60 145 251      358 30 205 669   35 104         11 5.39% 358 39.62% 35 104         11 0.001367 319 0.001692 1 266           11 0.175726 158 0.176857 1 266           
12 54 487 968      374 13 160 802   29 490         12 5.26% 374 14.16% 29 490         12 0.000994 338 0.001655 1 053           12 0.309328 155 0.220153 1 053           
2014 58 976 299      3 966           10 236 922   363 424      2014 6.32% 3 966           16.08% 363 424      2014 0.001243 3477 0.001415 11 440         2014 0.230622 1952 0.249026 11 440         
1 69 114 726      584 7 621 044      41 131         1 10.12% 584 12.77% 41 131         1 0.001400 529 0.001581 1 395           1 0.178339 283 0.255427 1 395           
2 49 112 329      365 22 828 404   31 444         2 4.42% 365 27.57% 31 444         2 0.001376 317 0.001523 1 185           2 0.288806 159 0.212398 1 185           
3 62 441 667      360 11 553 761   32 290         3 5.51% 360 13.90% 32 290         3 0.000922 317 0.001558 1 236           3 0.223165 167 0.323467 1 236           
4 63 969 863      365 5 991 497      35 040         4 5.79% 365 8.50% 35 040         4 0.000889 310 0.001400 1 184           4 0.188815 169 0.250310 1 184           
5 75 882 716      486 7 846 561      34 268         5 8.88% 486 10.78% 34 268         5 0.001312 430 0.001404 1 194           5 0.235299 249 0.242416 1 194           
6 59 791 762      437 8 550 605      37 986         6 6.33% 437 13.27% 37 986         6 0.001038 374 0.001426 1 180           6 0.229424 248 0.246196 1 180           
7 41 329 305      331 6 514 044      52 267         7 3.25% 331 13.57% 52 267         7 0.002383 294 0.001278 1 397           7 0.399058 156 0.231454 1 397           
8 58 857 942      447 17 397 509   39 606         8 6.23% 447 26.33% 39 606         8 0.001145 394 0.001301 1 267           8 0.209385 224 0.245487 1 267           
9 45 322 335      591 8 129 853      59 392         9 6.38% 591 18.08% 59 392         9 0.000927 512 0.001310 1 402           9 0.201899 297 0.255540 1 402           
10 10 10 10
11 11 11 11
Total 58 116 652      14 136         8 986 175      5 310 922   Total 3.95% 14 136         19.44% 5 310 922   Total 0.009945 12 239         0.002084 69 282         Total 0.267130 5 160           0.409756 69 282         
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 Appendix 4: Example of raw data and liquidity measures for a random Norwegian covered bond 
Trade ID ISIN Ticker Date Price Volume Price change Roll Measure Relative price change
113255 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 10/04/2012 104.7 10 000 000   0.55 0.190177 0.005281
115234 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 23/05/2012 105.4 500 000         0.27 0.194070 0.002568
115438 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 30/05/2012 105.22 15 000 000   -0.18 0.055921 0.001708
116526 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 26/06/2012 105.35 20 000 000   0.13 0.108155 0.001236
116638 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 28/06/2012 105.38 5 000 000      0.03 0.124579 0.000285
117142 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 10/07/2012 106.32 10 000 000   0.94 0.162708 0.008920
119735 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 12/09/2012 107.17 30 000 000   -0.48 0.161015 0.004459
119922 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 14/09/2012 107.45 20 000 000   0.28 0.178191 0.002613
120203 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 19/09/2012 107.41 20 000 000   -0.04 0.200667 0.000372
120202 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 19/09/2012 107.51 7 000 000      0.1 0.176951 0.000931
120389 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 21/09/2012 107.59 10 000 000   0.08 0.166626 0.000744
123459 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 12/11/2012 107.97 15 000 000   0.38 0.173233 0.003532
124125 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 22/11/2012 107.52 25 000 000   -0.45 0.169966 0.004168
124394 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 28/11/2012 108.07 15 000 000   0.55 0.307519 0.005115
124573 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 30/11/2012 107.9 3 000 000      -0.17 0.331592 0.001573
124643 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 30/11/2012 108.039 52 000 000   0.139 0.329980 0.001288
124644 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 03/12/2012 108.1 1 000 000      0.061 0.336346 0.000565
124720 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 03/12/2012 107.97 5 000 000      -0.13 0.275791 0.001203
124813 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 06/12/2012 108.05 1 000 000      0.08 0.323663 0.000741
125599 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 12/12/2012 108.057 30 000 000   0.007 0.282152 0.000065
125850 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 13/12/2012 108.23 20 000 000   0.173 0.349018 0.001601
125852 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 13/12/2012 108.25 35 000 000   0.02 0.306296 0.000185
126764 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 03/01/2013 107.92 15 000 000   -0.33 0.306495 0.003048
127089 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 07/01/2013 107.82 10 000 000   -0.1 0.293891 0.000927
128488 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 21/01/2013 107.5 15 000 000   -0.32 0.261865 0.002968
131400 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 25/02/2013 107.07 2 000 000      0.6 0.059483 0.005635
133185 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 19/03/2013 108.15 10 000 000   0.12 0.143444 0.001111
133987 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 05/04/2013 108.13 10 000 000   -0.02 0.162900 0.000185
133986 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 05/04/2013 108.17 30 000 000   0.04 0.171811 0.000370
135363 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 19/04/2013 108.34 10 000 000   0.17 0.206619 0.001572
142259 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 08/08/2013 107.47 60 000 000   -0.87 0.174022 0.008030
171161 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 04/07/2014 107.66 10 000 000   0.23 0.111370 0.002141
171499 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 09/07/2014 107.61 10 000 000   -0.05 0.136029 0.000464
171811 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 16/07/2014 107.63 28 000 000   0.02 0.135554 0.000186
172360 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 01/08/2014 107.46 114 000 000 -0.17 0.126230 0.001579
172561 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 06/08/2014 107.44 17 000 000   -0.02 0.111072 0.000186
173649 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 20/08/2014 107.02 30 000 000   -0.42 0.104980 0.003909
174008 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 25/08/2014 106.89 30 000 000   -0.13 0.065120 0.001215
175330 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 10/09/2014 107 1 000 000      0.11 0.087731 0.001029
175331 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 10/09/2014 107.02 13 000 000   0.02 0.073273 0.000187
175496 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 11/09/2014 107.06 50 000 000   0.04 0.067326 0.000374
176159 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 18/09/2014 107.21 27 000 000   0.15 0.062227 0.001401
176380 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 22/09/2014 106.92 25 000 000   -0.29 0.094241 0.002705
176719 NO0010598857 DNBNB04 24/09/2014 106.95 1 000 000      0.03 0.098386 0.000281
